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Abstract  
Historical studies of  U.S. capital markets show a dramatic skew in the distribution of  
corporate wealth. This thesis investigates the evolution of  economic thought related to realistic 
models of  competition, seeking to f ind the most suitable theory of  comp etition to explain this skew 
in U.S. corporate wealth creation. The incorporation of  realistic elements into the static theories of  
competition leads to theoretical dif ficulties in the early 20th century. Another line of  thought 
developed non-equilibrium dynamic models of  competition, culminating in Schumpeter. In 
Schumpeter, f irms seek to manage the uncertainty f rom rapid change induced by innovation and 
increasing returns by following regulative business strategies to reduce the uncertainty of  
investment. Failure to manage the uncertainty of  investment results in “creative destruction,” 
allowing f irms with superior strategies to reap disproporation rewards, resulting in a skewed 
distribution of  corporate wealth, until the environment changes to undermine the previously 
successful strategy.  
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1.1 Motivating Questions 
 
Our interest in this paper is to examine economic theories of  competition which can best 
meet realistic theoretical conditions and economic history. In particular, we are searching for 
theories of  competition which can encounter and describe the signif icant  skew in the distribution 
of  U.S. public corporate wealth creation since 1926 (“wealth creation”). Wealth creation is def ined 
as the increase in the aggregate value of  a f irm’s common stock in excess of  that which would 
have otherwise been obtained by investing in risk f ree securities.  
The skew in the distribution implies the persistent presence of  f irms which capture and 
maintain signif icant market share—implying signif icant prof it potential—yet whose continued 
existence and dominance is not assured. Many of  these f irms, af ter all, dominate records of  
corporate wealth creation for decades only to go out of  business. In other words, the f inancial 
record in the United States strongly suggests that the most realistic theory of  competition will be 
one of  monopolistic competition with super normal prof its which are, nevertheless, uncertain in 
the long run.  
In this paper, we will f irst go over the most realistic theories of  competition f rom 
marginalist economics looking specifically at Alf red Marshall, Piero Sraf fa and Edward 
Chamberlin. We will then review the dynamic theory of  competitive behavior in Joseph 
Schumpeter, Frank Knight and Maurice Dobb. Our conclusion is that Schumpeter’s approach to 
the theory of  competition is more developed and specif ic than is commonly recognized. It is 
established on a well developed theoretical foundation within the prior literature and builds of f  an 
inf requently discussed branch of  competition theory running f rom a young Schumpeter to Knight 
and Dobb before coming back to Schumpeter. The well known concept of  “creative destruction” is 
 
2 
rarely put into its proper context of  justif ication for Schumpeter’s theory of  monopolistic 
competition which, to some observers of  the 1940s, seemed to amount to a defense of  
monopolistic corporate practices.  
It is appropriate to view Schumpeter’s theory as superseding and incorporating the 
advances in dynamic theory made by Frank Knight and Maurice Dobb. Allyn Young’s famous 
1928 paper on increasing returns is discussed as it ref lects an early stage sketch of  a dynamic 
theory of  competition, while providing a more technical discussion of  the pervasive increasing 
returns environment. These increasing returns are themselves responsible for creating the rapidly 
changing environment, which creates the fundamentally  uncertain environment that needs to be 
managed by f irms in their competitive process. Thus, while Young’s contributions in this direction 
were cut short by this untimely death in 1929, his rigorous analysis of  the importance of  
increasing returns helps to explain theoretically the creatively destructive environment which f irms 
f ind themselves in: increasing returns create rapid economic change which cut away the basis for 
generalizations, resulting in new avenues for innovative investment, resulting in fundamental 
uncertainty, resulting in the requirement that f irms plan to manage this uncertainty. Management 
of  this uncertainty, in Schumpeter, means f irms take competitive actions that they believe are the 
most likely to help them control and inf luence their proximate economic environment.  
If  “creative destruction” is one half  of  Schumpeter’s theory, the other half  is his theory of  
“regulative strategies” to manage this uncertainty of  future prof its. Firms follow competitive 
policies—set prices, make adjustments to products, follow certain sales strategies, follow certain 
investment processes, among other things—on the basis of  a general plan, a “regulative 
strategy,” developed to manage the long term uncertainty of  their investment which arises f rom 
operating in a rapidly changing economic environment. 
Some specif ic techniques of  managing uncertainty will be discussed when we review 
Frank Knight’s work where he refers to common techniques used to manage uncertainty. Firms, 
in their quest for prof its, invest with a desire for returns yet the specif ic policy of investment is, in 
Schumpeter, made on the dual basis of  whether it helps to protect past investment f rom new 
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competition, in addition to the desire of  generating new streams of  prof it. Firms in this model will 
seek to expand continuously so as to diversify and f ind new avenues for growth—growth 
becomes the health of  the enterprise in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Instead of  simply 
looking at the raw mathematics of  M-C-M’ driving accumulation, it is the threat of  future 
destruction and the goal of  protecting existing profit streams which drive further accumulation 
through investment.  
These approaches can be contrasted with marginalist economics where economists 
approached realistic theories by attempting to take into account widely observed phenomena, 
such as increasing returns to scale in manufacturing and oligopic market structures. As we will 
discuss in our review of  static marginalist economics, incorporating these phenomena into static 
models lead to further dif f iculties and, ultimately, a chain of  events which resulted in the decline in 
Marshallian economics. It was in the shadow of  these events that leading economists, like Knight 
and Schumpeter, began to suggest a strong distinction between static and dynamic theories of  
economic analysis.  
The historical results f rom US capital markets broaden the focus of  the theory of  
competition away f rom only looking at the median or typical corporate f irm, which we will see 
produces meagre f inancial returns, to the median or typical increase in corporate wealth, the 
latter of  which will be concentrated in a small number of  super f irms. A theory of  competition can 
only be adequate if  it is able to deal with the median f irm as well as the super f irm, especially 
since the median increase in corporate wealth is found within the super f irms. It is these super 
f irms which, f requently holding signif icant market share, determine average f inancial returns and 
determine other average relationships throughout their industry and the economy more broadly. 
Many theories, particularly static theories, are designed explicitly to only deal with the average 
f irm and, by def inition, exclude these super f irms f rom the analysis.  
Instead of  competing on price, even understood in its most abstract way, competition in 
the dynamic theories proceeds on a much more complex basis, taking into account realistic 
institutional arrangements. Schumpeter is said to have viewed the book in which this theory is 
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presented, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, as allowing for economic theory in the context 
of  institutional change. In this sense, competition through “regulative strategies” can be seen as 
working to reduce the long term uncertainty of  investment within its realistic institutionalis t 
context.  
 In the initial reviews of  Schumpeter’s dynamic theory, some felt his theory of  “regulative 
strategies” was an inappropriate defense of  monopolistic behavior, while hailing the language of  
“creative destruction,” a term borrowed f rom Werner Sombart. This general reaction has carried 
through to the present where his theory of  monopolistic competition is inf requently taught and 
hardly examined in detail and theoretical origin.   
As we will show, creative destruction and regulative strategies are complimentary. It is 
the uncertainty f rom rapid economic change which can cause “creative destruction,” which results 
in f irm’s following “regulative strategies” to manage the uncertainty f rom change. From this point 
of  view, Schumpeter is attempting to put forward a dynamic theory of  competition which can 
serve economics in its traditional role of  regulating qualities and quantities within the economic 
system, all within the context of  pervasive “monopolistic competition.”  
While there is some evidence that Schumpeter is not entirely satisf ied with his solution to 
the problem of  realistic competition, this theory of  corporate f irms pursuing strategy to manage 
uncertainty f rom rapid economic change represents the best theory he could come up within his 
lifetime. Unlike a theory which presumes all competition to proceed on the basis of  price—or, in 
its more developed form under Chamberlin, where it proceeds on the basis of  price, advertising 
expense and product variation—this theory is inclusive of  all forms of  competitive behavior 
overtime within a realistic and complex institutional context. It is not necessarily an abstract 
theory of  a single product f irm in a single market but rather a theory of  the behavior of  a unit of  
capital seeking to survive and grow. In that sense, it is properly seen as a theory of  the process of  
competition with the successful result being prof its.  
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1.2 Competition in Economic Theory 
 Competition in economic theory plays the critical role of  regulating qualities and 
quantities, notably price and output in static economics, and is the actuating force behind the 
distribution of  resources and the division of  labor. The economic literature over the last 150 years 
makes important, but wholly theoretical, distinctions between “perfect competition,” “pure 
competition,” “imperfect competition,” and “monopolistic competition,” contrasting these with 
“absolute monopoly” where competition offers no forces to regulate prof its or output. These 
concepts have meaning largely as a means of  describing different market structures at 
equilibrium within the context of  static marginalist equilibrium economics. For the purposes of  this 
essay, we take it for granted that there is a clear distinction between static economics and —
employing any of  the wide number of  terms used by Schumpeter and Knight—“dynamic,” 
“development,” “historical,” or “evolutionary” economics. The latter theories can be said to deal 
with actual outcomes in historical time, the former only with theoretical outcomes with f ixed sets 
of  factors. 
 According to McNulty, the analytic function of  competition in economic analysis was 
already well developed by the time Adam Smith turned to the question in The Wealth of Nations. 
McNulty cites the use of  the theory of  competition in Boisguillebert, Cantillon, Turgot, James 
Steuart and Adam Smith’s colleague David Hume.1 Competitions “analytical function was its 
recognized tendency to bring the market price to a level which would eliminate both excessive 
prof its and unsatisf ied demand, that is, to the lowest level sustainable over the long run.”2 Smith’s 
competitive process was a dynamic rivalrous process for profits with capital f lowing into new 
markets with high prof its and out of  markets with low prof its, all with prof its being directionally 
related to “risk” without being proportionate. Ricardo limits his analysis to markets where 
competition operates without “restraint.” We will see that our modern environment of fers many 
 
1 Paul J. Mcnulty, “A Note on the History of Perfect Competition,” Journal of Political Economy 75, no. 4, Part 1 (1967): pp. 






competitive restraints, although ones far dif ferent f rom the legal restraints of  the early 19th 
century. Mill famously states, just before discussing problems which result in f rictions impeding 
the operations of  competition, that “only through the principle of  competition has political economy 
any pretension to the character of  a science."3  
 The conceptual construction of  perfect competition was well advanced before the turn of  
the 20th century. Yet by the end of  the 19th century, a corporate merger movement had 
dramatically altered the industrial landscape and global world wide trade was at a high point 
under the gold standard managed by the Bank of  England. Domestic markets in the United States 
and Europe were stitched together by train and telegraph. International markets were stitched 
together by steam ships and undersea telegraph cables. The creation of  national markets opened 
the way to economies of  scale and new business strategies embodied in size. The era of  big 
business, which began with the railroads, was in full swing. The environment looked increasingly 
dif ferent f rom which was embodied in the mathematical economics of  Walras, although the 
competitive theory within the American and British economic profession was not yet, as it would 
become, “rigorously” def ined. Marshall’s popular textbook repeatedly notes that the problems of  
partial equilibrium analysis and the problems of  taking supply and demand analysis too far. High 
quality data on stock returns to calculate corporate wealth creation only starts in 1926, just as 
industrial f irms begin to dominate the US capital markets af ter decades of  being built up by 
railroad securities.4  
 The railroads by themselves had already presented intellectual problems for competitive 
analysis. Allyn Young and Joseph Schumpeter f irst befriend each other at a conference 
discussing economic theory and railroad pricing and, characteristically, disagree about regulation. 
Edward Chamberlin, who later coined the term “product dif ferentiation” in his ef fort to describe 
 
3 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy (Charleston, SC: 
BiblioLife, 2009), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/30107/30107-pdf.pdf, p. 176. 
 
4 For a discussion of the composition of US capital markets across this period, see Mary A. O'Sullivan, Dividends of 
Development: Securities Markets in the History of US Capitalism, 1866-1922 (Oxford, England: Oxford University press, 




“monopolistic competition” in static equilibrium, was inspired by the Taussig -Pigou controversy 
over railway rates. Chamberlin’s youthful conclusion was that:  
“[The railroad] cannot secure an increased share in the more prof itable market by of fering 
a lower price, for his competitors will follow at once, and relative shares will be the same 
as before. He, therefore, sets such prices in each market as will make his total return a 
maximum, and, in doing so, he will take account of  the strength of  the demand in each 
case, charging "what the traf f ic will bear." If  the total returns to each seller are large, there 
will be more sellers, rather than a readjustment of  their price policies.”5 
 
This conclusion, authored prior to Sraf fa’s famous 1926 analysis but resembling it, can be seen 
as embodying the elements which are to become the equilibrium app roach to imperfect market 
structures. As will be seen below, in Chamberlin’s f inal equilibrium analysis he assumes away 
those very f irms which gives rise to the extraordinary distribution in corporate wealth creation 
found by Bessembinder.6 The general thrust of  excluding these extreme wealth creators is typical 
of  the marginalist literature. For instance, Marshall dismisses f irms which are able to obtain 
increasing returns to scale over a long period of  time because these are “very few” f irms. Of  
course, it is these very few f irm’s which raise the most interesting—and perhaps most important—
questions for the theory of  competition and material economic progress. These f irms, af ter all, by 
dominating their respective market sectors have a huge inf luence on p ricing and the direction of  
industry.  
It is thought that to produce a “general” theory, it must explain the median f irm but, in 
doing this, it risks missing what is also important, namely, that the median increment of  corporate 
wealth is created in an unusually rare f irm. A median publicly traded f irm, according to 
Bessembinder’s analysis, provides less return to its equity investors than do monthly government 
treasuries. Or, in other words, an investor’s capital will increase faster by investing in monthly 
government bills than in any randomly chosen public corporate f irm. This historical fact is, as we 
will see shortly, at odds with the old generalizations of  academic f inance. A “general theory” of  
competitive behavior cannot dismiss outliers when these do not represent the median f irm 
 
5  Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), p. 295. 
 





because these same outliers represent the median increment of  corporate wealth creation. The 
marginal increment of  corporate wealth creation, or what can be thought of  as the “creation of  
capital values,” does not have its source in a “marginal” or “representative” or “median” f irm. 
These outlier f irms, through their extraordinary inf luence, are important vectors for determining 
other average relationships throughout the economy. Furthermore, public corporate equities 
make up a signif icant portion of  total U.S. household and nonprof it f inancial assets, with direct 
ownership of  equities accounting for 20.4% of  household and nonprof it f inancial assets in the 
United States, with signif icant indirect ownership through mutual funds  (10% of  U.S. household 
and nonprof it f inancial assets) and pension funds (29.3% of  U.S. household and nonprof it 
f inancial assets).7   
The top f irm in our extension of  Bessembinder accounts for some 2.6% of  all U.S. 
corporate wealth creation in the 91 year period 1926 through 2017. This f irm, Apple Inc., has had 
a signif icant social and economic impact. In the historical record, however, there have been other 
f irms of  this nature and there exist a number of  f irms of this type—it is not a single instance but a 
persistent group of  important instances in the history of  US capitalism. The future will likely bring 
about new super wealth creators, which will ref lect their inf luence on the economic relationships 
of  their time. The challenge for economic theory is that these examples are excluded f rom static 
analysis, as in Chamberlin.  
 Any theoretical explanation which stops where Chamberlin stops leaves open important 
questions. For instance, if  a few f irms do not respond to competition as might be expected in the 
static approach, what ultimately regulates these f irms? Why do they grow,  dominate and die? 
Take the case of  General Motors, founded in 1908. By the end of  1970, General Motors was the 
greatest wealth creator in the United States—perhaps the world—since the beginning of  the 
record in 1926. Its life, however, ended in bankruptcy and wealth destruction for investors in 
 
7 Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System. Z1 Financial Accounts of the United States (September 21, 2020), 
distributed by the Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System. 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20200921/z1.pdf. See Table B.101, p. 138. The remainder of U.S. household 
financial assets are in currency, deposits, money market funds, debt securities, life insurance, and equity in noncorporate 





2009. By excluding the extreme f irms f rom static analysis, it also excludes how competition works 
on these f irms over time and glosses over their pivotal role in shaping industries.  
 In what follows, we will f irst discuss the f indings of Bessembinder in more detail to 
illustrate the nature of  the motivating historical observations. We extend his work to look at the 
distribution in corporate wealth creation in rolling ten year periods to examine whether the skew in 
corporate wealth has changed over time. We will see that in every ten year period there is a small 
group of  f irm’s which dominate corporate wealth creation in that period or, in other words, there is 
a persistent tendency for wealth creation to be concentrated in a small number of  super f irms. We 






2. Bessembinder and The Skew In Corporate Wealth 
Creation 
 In the theory of  capital values put forward by Irving Fisher in 1907, the value of  capital is 
its prospective income stream, discounted and adjusted for the shape of  the income f low and the 
risks to that stream of  income.8 The capital values measured in Bessembinder are ref lective of  
changes in equity prices, which ref lect the future as understood by investors in every month since 
January 1926. It is our assumption, with Fischer Black, that security prices are ef f icient in that 
they are within a “factor of  2 of  value 90% of  the time.”9 Given that, we assume that security 
prices can serve as a guide to capital values as created by the competitive process over long 
periods of  time. We look to corporate wealth creation, instead of  accounting prof its, since the 
prof it to the capitalist and entrepreneur (who is typically also a “capitalist” in the sense of  owning 
part of  the f irm’s capital) is in part f rom the appreciation of  their capital, which can come f rom the 
mere expectations of  prof its, not necessarily f rom actual prof its themselves. To illustrate this 
point, the 5th greatest corporate wealth creator over the 91 year period is Amazon, a f irm which 
purposefully avoided profitability to avoid taxation. By doing so, it was able to retain more capital 
for reinvestment. Such phenomenon can never be captured by looking at returns f rom the 
perspective of  accounting prof its and can only be seen by looking at capital appreciation in the 
capital markets. The notion that capital appreciation needs to be counted as “prof its” was noted 
early in the literature by Veblen and Dobb.  
 
8 Irving Fisher, The Rate of Interest: Its Nature, Determination and Relation to Economic Phenomena (Mansfield Center, 
CT: Martino Pub., 2009). 
 
9 Fischer Black, “Noise,” The Journal of Finance 41, no. 3 (1986): pp. 528-543, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-




Bessembinder is coming f rom the f inance tradition and is investigating the distribution of  
f inancial returns over time, scaled according to the number of  shares outstanding . Put another 
way, he is investigating the relative increase in aggregate equity f inancial capital per f irm 
overtime. His paper’s period of  investigation begins in 1926 and runs through the end of  2016. 
Our own extension repeats this result through 2017 and breaks down the analysis into rolling ten 
year periods. 
The f inancial profession has long been interested in the dif ferences in returns between 
stocks and bonds. An early 1924 analysis which Keynes popularized argued that stocks as a 
class have greater returns than bonds due to reinvested prof its, resulting in compound interest 
ef fects.10 The now widespread notion of  equities providing greater returns than bonds was 
crystallized in a series of  papers out of  Chicago’s Center for Research into Securities Prices 
(“CRSP”) in the 1960s. By the 1980s, it was canon and f inance academ ics began to refer to it as 
the “equity premium puzzle.” To these f inance academics, it was not clear why stocks should 
perform so much better than bonds as a class and the study Keynes had reviewed in the 1920s 
was long forgotten. The source of  this confusion is Modigliani and Miller’s 1958 “capital structure 
irrelevance” theory which says that, ignoring bankruptcy, taxes, and growth, equity and debt 
instruments should have the same returns or, put another way, should require the same discount 
rate to equate their specif ic cash f lows to present value. Thus, the capital structure of  f irms should 
be “irrelevant” to total enterprise value, inclusive of  equity and debt capital. 11  
 Bessembinder is writing at the end of  this long tradition in f inance. The skew in stock 
returns is known and is seen as adding to the arguments for portfolio diversification. Still, it is 
widely considered to be relatively unimportant and, in extreme cases, anomalous. Bessembinder 
breaks new ground by investigating this skew and combining it with the aggregate amount of  
capital which exists in any period. From this analysis, he shows that there is a huge skew in 
 
10 Edgar Lawrence. Smith, Common Stocks as Long Term Investments (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1935). Reinvestment 
is considered the primary effect but it is one of a number of effects the author lists, including management bias in favor of  
equity investors and against bond holders. 
 
11 Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,” The 




corporate wealth creation over the 90 year period of  1926 through 2016. Over the life of  any 
publicly traded stock, only 42.1% of  them have lifetime returns above those of  risk f ree monthly 
government treasury bills.12 This challenges the canon of  the “equity premium” and suggests that 
any positive premium which exists for the class is simply due to the fact that the mean of  the 
skewed distribution is higher than the median.  
It is no longer that equities as a class outperform bonds but rather a very small portion of  
the distribution outperform bonds in an extraordinary fashion. In the history of  American 
capitalism, the examples of  this are numerous. The historical record shows a US cigarette f irm 
having compounded returns of  17.6% per annum for 91 years, a f igure far above the bond yields 
for nearly a century.13 Amazon, which has shown little to no prof its over the period, has returned 
38% per annum over 20 years. Bessembinder investigates whether these ef fects are due to 
f inancial leverage and f inds that it plays no role.14  
 Bessembinder’s analysis is over a 90 year period and taken in aggregate f inds that 4% of  
securities make up all the positive wealth over monthly government treasury bills. The bottom 
96% of  f irms produce collectively zero net corporate wealth over monthly government treasury 
bills. To investigate if  the skew in wealth creation persists across smaller periods , we extended 
Bessembinder’s analysis to look at rolling ten year periods beginning with the 10 year period 
1926 to 1936 and continued every year through the end of  2017. Through our extension of  
Bessembinder, we have found a relatively stationary distribution of  wealth creation over time, 
exclusive of  periods of financial stress which f lattens and reverses the skew.  
 
12 Hendrik Bessembinder, “Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017, 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2900447, p. 1. 
 
13 Bessembinder measures “corporate wealth creation” by looking at monthly price returns in the stocks of US public 
corporations and comparing those returns with a “risk free” security, in this case the monthly US treasury bill. Dividends in  
any month would count towards excess returns, with taxes being excluded from the analysis. Altria’s extraordinary return 
is in part due to a period of paying large dividends throughout the period. Whatever excess return exists would then be 
scaled to the number of shares the firm had outstanding. These excess returns generated by corporate equity securities 
above the monthly treasury bill, in the period between 1926 and 2017, would then be brought forward to the present using 
forward discounting at the risk-free rate and summed. Ibid., p. 17 - 18. 
 




2.1 Results of Skew Overtime 
 In Figure 1, we show the adjusted Fisher Pearson skew for corporate wealth creation in 
each 10 year distribution. This indicates that in most periods there is a positive skew in the 
distribution of  corporate wealth creation. In other words, in most periods  a small number of  f irms 
account for a disproportionate share of  corporate wealth creation. Dates indicate the end date of  
each 10 year period:   
Figure 1 
 
The periods of  negative skew, such as the period ending in January 2010, ref lect features unique 
to this period, notably the fall in asset prices due to the f inancial crisis of  2008. Similar f inancial 
ef fects occur in the periods ending in the middle of  the 1970s (the dramatic increase in input 
prices, notable oil, resulting in recession) and early 1980s (the uniquely high interest rates which 
resulted in lower stock prices). In periods without these peculiar ef fects, it can be seen that, as a 
stylized fact, in most ten year periods there is a strong positive skew in the distribution of  
corporate wealth creation. 
 Before looking at the signif icant concentration of  corporate wealth creation in the top few 
f irms, it is worthwhile contextualizing this dataset. The data f rom the CRSP is the standard data 
 
14 
set used by f inancial academics for the study of  equity prices. Below is number of  observations, 




The number of  securities in the sample before the mid -1960s suggests that there may be some 
survivorship bias within the CRSP dataset. This conclusion is also suggested by the kurtosis of  
the dataset, a measure which ref lects extreme values in the data set—outliers—or the heavy 
tailedness of  the distribution. This measure is relevant because the extreme leptokurtic nature of  
the data set suggests the extraordinary degree of  outliers within the data set, notably, the super 













The above data indicates that there are extreme outliers, with kurtosis values over 3 being 
considered leptokurtic. These features of  the data set are important to keep in mind as we look at 
the level of  concentration of  the top f irm, the top f ive f irms and the top twenty f ive f irms. These 
examples illustrate the importance of  super f irms in any given ten year period.  
2.2 Concentration of Wealth Creation in Top Firms 
Consider the percentage of  gross wealth creation contributed by the top corporate wealth 













Clearly, the most important f irm in terms of  wealth creation in any given period is a signif icant 
aspect to understanding the competitive results of  any given 10 year period. The f irm which 
produced 21% of  all gross corporate wealth between 1926 through 1936 is General Motors, a 
measure which is likely exaggerated by the ef fects of the great depression and survivorship bias 
in the early part of  the data set. In the most recent period, 4.75% of  all U.S. corporate wealth 
creation between 2008 and 2018 was Apple. In Appendix 1, you can f ind the list of  the top 
corporate wealth creators in any given period.  
 The skew in the distribution can be seen when we look at the top f ive and top twenty -f ive 











In the last 35 years, one can suggest as a stylized fact that the top f ive wealth creating f irms 
create between 15% and 25% of  all gross public corporate wealth creation in any given 10 year 





A suggested stylized fact here is that in the last 40 years, the top 25 f irms account for more than 
25% and less than 40% of  the corporate wealth creation in any given 10 year period.  
 In addition to the above distribution overtime, there remains other features of  the historic 
data set which are necessary to keep in mind in the forthcoming discussion. Looking at the top 15 
f irms across the whole period between 1926 through 2017, we see that a number of  them 
produce very high annualized returns for very long periods of  time:  
Table 1 
 










APPLE INC 1980-12-31 2017-12-29 17.04% $1,036 37.0 
EXXON MOBIL CORP 1925-12-31 2017-12-29 11.66% $1,011 92.0 
MICROSOFT CORP 1986-03-31 2017-12-29 25.49% $825 31.8 
ALPHABET INC 2014-04-30 2017-12-29 20.68% $537 3.7 
AMAZON COM INC 1997-05-30 2017-12-29 38.20% $536 20.6 
IBM 1925-12-31 2017-12-29 13.52% $525 92.0 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON 1944-09-30 2017-12-29 15.64% $504 73.3 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 1925-12-31 2017-12-29 9.91% $503 92.0 
ALTRIA GROUP INC 1925-12-31 2017-12-29 17.60% $489 92.0 
WAL MART STORES INC 1972-11-30 2017-12-29 19.00% $466 45.1 
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 1976-10-29 2017-12-29 22.59% $443 41.2 
GENERAL MOTORS CORP 1925-12-31 2009-06-30 5.63% $439 83.5 
CHEVRON CORP NEW 1925-12-31 2017-12-29 10.95% $419 92.0 
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 1929-08-30 2017-12-29 10.47% $386 88.3 
COCA COLA CO 1925-12-31 2017-12-29 13.05% $356 92.0 
 
The top two are very large f irms with high returns, necessarily resulting in being 
represented as signif icant wealth creators for their owners. There are, however, also smaller f irms 
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with long periods of  superior wealth creation, like the cigarette producer Altria Group with returns 
of  17.6% per annum compounded for 92 years. 
 A theory of  competition must encounter these features of  the historic record, namely, the 
numerous instances of  high annualized returns on capital, the long lengths of  time these returns 
persist, the resulting signif icant skew in wealth creation, as well as the fact that f irms which once 
rank in the top tier of  wealth creators later disappear f rom upper ranks, like Kodak, a f irm cited by 
Chamberlin in 1933.  
It is not possible to explain the above results in their specif icity except by an exacting 
analysis of  historical records. These results, however, represent the type of  stylized facts which 
economic theory, specif ically the theory of  competition, must be able to encounter and explain 
theoretically. The theory of  competition must be able to deal with those few f irms which generate 
corporate wealth far in excess of  other f irms. As Bessembinder has written, these results raise 
the question about whether existing theory can account for the degree of  concentration in terms 
of  the creation of  corporate wealth.15 These exceptional f irms, persistent across the entire data 
set, determine average returns and other average relationships, like long term return expectations 
on investment, industry pricing, average quality and expected service levels. In what follows, we 
will look at whether the theories of  competition f rom the literature can explain these historical 
results. We will f irst look at static theories of  compet ition and then turn to dynamic theories of  
competition.
 





3. Static Models of Competition  
To understand the rationale for clearly separating dynamic f rom static competitive 
analysis, and moreover the reasons why Schumpeter is forced to reject static analysis, it is 
important to review the development of  realistic static models of  competition. A literature review 
must begin with Marshall and his attempt to include increasing returns to scale f rom 
manufacturing into a static model of  competition. This is generally seen as a failure but how it fails 
and how economic theorists attempt to rectify the mistakes inform the entire debate around 
realistic models of  competition in static theory. The static approach attempts to include realistic 
market structures, such as oligopoly, as well as including realistic cost functions, like returns to 
scale ef fects or increasing returns. The static models of  competition do not, however, expressly 
deal with fundamental uncertainty in the theory of  competition, something that was formally 
introduced by Frank Knight in 1921. In terms of  the static approach to competition theory, we will 
look at Marshall, Straf fa and Chamberlin as illustrations of  the problems which arise in static 
economic theory. We will then turn to the dynamic theories of  Young, Knight, Dobb and 
Schumpeter.  
3.1 Marshall 
Marshall provides an analysis of  competition with realistic increasing returns to scale in 
Chapter XII of  Principles of Economics. It is this analysis which, due to its attempt at realism, 
helps inspire later critiques which ultimately discredit Marshall’s economics. These few pages of  
Marshall, while ref lecting only a sliver of  Marshall’s work, usefully foreshadow a number of  
debates regarding the nature of  oligopolic markets, static equilibrium and increasing returns.  
Marshall separates his analysis into the short and long period, with the short period being 
one of  f ixed factors and decreasing returns, implying a f ixed number of  f irms in the short run. In 
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the long period, it is assumed new f irms are formed and increasing returns have their ef fect. With 
manufactured products, the short period price is set in a realistic dealer market where price 
movements are determined by inventories on hand and the expectations of  prices in the “next 
market.” In the long period for manufactured products, however, the average cost will be 
decreasing. Firms will, therefore, experience increasing returns and, in this context, supply can be 
theoretically inf inite given the construction of  supply and demand curves.16 This is Cournot’s of t 
repeated conclusion that increasing returns in manufacturing results in monopolies. In reality, we 
do not see the creation of  absolute monopolies in this fashion. Therefore, to f it reality into the 
static model, output must be stopped either by having falling revenue with increasing output or by 
increasing costs with increasing output (decreasing returns) to arrive at an equilibrium.  
Marshall solves this dilemma in two ways. First, by suggesting that a continuous advance 
in supply at decreasing costs will eventually be stopped by a decay in a f irm’s managerial ability 
and that, at such times, the increasing returns which “enabled it to rise” will cause it to be 
“destroyed.” Secondly, in the context of  an industry, f irm’s are conf ined to their “particular market” 
and therefore “any hasty increase in its production is likely to lower the demand price in that 
market out of  all proportion to the increased economies that it will gain.”17  
In a footnote, Marshall writes that an individual producer faces not the general demand 
curve for an industry but its own “particular demand curve” for his own “special market.” This 
demand curve will be extremely steep or inelastic which limits the potential application of  
increasing returns to scale for the f irm. Furthermore, Marshall argues that the number of  f irms to 
which increasing returns are achieved for long periods of time are “very few” and, furthermore, 
that there needs to be a sharp contrast between the economies of  scale for an individual f irm and 
for that of  an industry. The important point for our discussion is that, to Marshall, whatever 
monopoly elements may arise are a short run and special phenomenon.  
 
16 Principles, p. 378. 
 
17 Ibid., p. 379. 
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Clearly, even if  monopoly elements are a special phenomenon and that long periods  of  
increasing return dynamics are few, Bessembinder’s stylized results above show that this cannot 
be said to be a reason to ignore the few f irms which showcase extraordinary performance—those 
few f irms, af ter all, account for an important percentage of  corporate wealth creation. Marshall 
notes that his analysis requires that general economies f rom new inventions be excluded f rom the 
analysis, while also assuming a balance of  “progress and decay” between f irms. 18 This analysis, 
he writes, cannot be pushed too far because, as it: 
 “...verges on the high theme of  economic progress... it is especially needful to remember 
that economic problems are imperfectly presented when they are treated as problems of  
static equilibrium, and not of  organic growth... the statistical theory of  equilibrium is only 
an introduction to economic studies.”19  
 
Sraf fa, in his famous critique of  Marshall, ignores this admonition and picks up on the notion of  a  
“special market” for each f irm. He shows Marshall's conception of  equilib rium with increasing 
returns is inconsistent, all while suggesting a direction of  analysis where monopolistic competition 
is assumed to be, not a short run and special case, but a general element of  the competitive 
environment.  
3.2 Sraffa 
Sraf fa, in addition to succeeding in his goal that Marshall should be abandoned, was 
successful in pulling together the problems of  increasing returns, such as those raised above, and 
presenting a conception of  imperfect or monopolistically competitive markets which was t o 
become very inf luential. As Andrews has written, at the time of  Sraf fa’s critique, it was possible to 
either drop the industrial analysis of  Marshall or to drop the concept of  static equilibrium itself —
Sraf fa chooses to drop the former.20  
 
18 Ibid., p. 381. 
 
19 Ibid., p. 383. 
 
20 Philip W. S. Andrews, Frederic S. Lee, and Peter E. Earl, The Economics of Competitive Enterprise: Selected Essays of 




Sraf fa’s gains prominence, including an invitation by Keynes to teach in the UK, through 
showing how Marshall’s partial equilibrium f ramework breaks down when it is extended to simple 
conceptions of  economies of scale.21 Sraf fa’s conclusion is that to capture those ef fects one must 
turn to the theory of  monopoly as the general theory of  competitive behavior. Two empirical 
features need to be captured by this new theory of  competition Sraf fa writes. First, producers can, 
in fact, af fect the price and are not mere price takers whose output has a negligible ef fect on the 
price. Secondly, producers face decreasing costs or constant costs—not increasing costs.22 The 
problem is complicated by the fact that most markets are not ones of  “absolute monopoly.” In 
perfect competition, elasticity of demand is inf inite, in absolute monopoly it is a unity, but in the 
intermediate state, a “monopolist” has some control over price but must forgo some purchasers 
when it increases its price. These purchasers shif t their budgets to competing producers or other 
goods.  
 When Straf fa refers to the model in Marshall’s footnote referred to above, the demand 
curve for any particular f irm is a demand curve for its “special market,” Straf fa extends the 
analysis to say that: 
“...the possible buyers are entered in descending order according to the price which each 
of  them is prepared to pay, not rather than go entirely without, but rather than not buy it 
f rom that particular producer instead of  elsewhere...that is to say, that two elements enter 
into the composition of such demand prices-the price at which the goods can be 
purchased f rom those other producers who, in the order of  a purchaser's preference, 
immediately follow the producer under consideration, and the monetary measure of  the 
value (a quantity which may be positive or negative) which the purchaser puts on his 
preference for the products of  the f irm in question.”23 
 
Here two dif ferent types of  marginal customers regulate prices—those who are marginal to the 
particular f irm’s products, who enforce the limit by which a particular f irm may increase the price 
of  its product in its special market, and those who are at the margin of  the general market and 
 
21 Piero Sraffa, “The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions,” The Economic Journal 36, no. 144 (1926): p. 535, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2959866, p. 541. 
 
22 Chamberlin (1961, p. 310) mischaracterizes Sraffa as arguing that most firms compete in conditions of constant costs. 
This is one of a number of interesting mischaracterizations Chamberlin makes when it comes to Sraffa.  
 




who f ix a limit on the general increase in price.24 Straf fa notes that the incentives to increase 
prof its f rom price increases are more powerful than the incentives to increase prof its f rom price 
cuts, since the former imply greater prof its for the f irm and benef it competitors while the latter 
does not benef it competitors and calls forth retaliation. 
Straf fa disagrees with the popular conception of  an indeterminate equilibrium in the case 
of  multiple monopolies and cites Edgeworth’s comment that “the extent of  indeterminateness' 
diminishes with the diminution of  the degree of  correlation between the articles.”25 Sraf fa notes 
that the degrees of  dif ference in the special markets between the individual f irms will indicate the 
determinateness of  the equilibrium. Any individual case will be determined on the grounds of  
dif ferentiation unique to that industry. These results “require only a very slight degree of  
preference for a particular f irm in each of  the groups of  customers.”26  
This slight degree of  preference, as Chamberlin will argue apparently without  inspiration 
f rom Sraf fa, can be accomplished through product dif ferentiation. This represents a “tendency, 
which prevails even in actual cases where the conditions of  the various undertakings dif fer among 
each other, whereby the cumulative action of  slight obstacles to competition produces on prices 
ef fects which approximate to those of  monopoly.”27  
From these observations, a line is usually drawn to Chamberlin and Robinson, both of  
whom certainly appear to draw f rom Straf fa’s analysis. Schumpeter writes that Sraf fa’s article led 
to the creation of  the “English branch of  monopolistic competition.”28 This conclusion is admitted 
by Joan Robinson and rejected by Chamberlin who, writing af ter Schumpeter’s death in 1961, 
argues that his work was unrelated to the representative f irm and cost critiques of  Marshall, of  




25 Ibid., p. 548. 
 




28 Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 1012. 
 
29 Edward H. Chamberlin, “The Origin and Early Development of Monopolistic Competition Theory,” The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 75, no. 4 (1961): p. 515, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884318. 
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market to a collection of  separate markets by investigating trademarks and patents and writes 
that his analysis is inspired by Allyn Young’s descriptions of  trademarks and patents in Outlines of 
Economics. Chamberlin presents a novel analysis of  trademarks and patents as representing the 
semi-permeable barriers between the separate markets in a static equilib rium model of  
monopolistic competition.  
3.3 Chamberlin 
In 1951, Chamberlin writes that the theoretical conclusion of  his work is supposed to be 
general, in the same sense as Sraf fa’s suggestion for perfect competition to be replaced with 
monopolistic competition: “Where everything is perfectly divisible, economies of scale remain 
and, in a world of  human beings having diversif ied tastes, the f ree play of  economic forces would 
necessarily establish monopolistic competition.”30  
Chamberlin sees his work as establishing a general theory of  monopolistic competition—
which may explain why he defended his approach throughout his life. 31 Chamberlin builds on the 
insight that dif ferentiation allows for price adjustments above purely competitive prices and that, 
in a market with only a few sellers, the sellers would recognize their mutual dependence. This 
mutual dependence means that a decrease in price to obtain greater market share would result in 
competition responding by reducing prices, leaving market share the same as before but with less 
prof its. The recognition of  this mutual dependence would tend to prevent price based competition, 
as that is mutually unprof itable, and result in a tendency to charge what the traf f ic will bear. This 
result, he writes, is not a deviation f rom a welfare ideal.  
 
 
30 Edward H. Chamberlin, “Monopolistic Competition Revisited,” Economica 18, no. 72 (1951): p. 343, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2549607, p. 345. 
 
31 This can be compared to Joan Robinson’s opinion. She sees ideological bias in Chamberl in’s commitment to his theory, 
rather than an ambition to rewrite the foundations of economics. See Joan Violet Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect 




Chamberlin’s is said to have coined “product dif ferentiation” and his discussion of  
trademarks is novel and, in its contrarian conclusions, breaks important new ground by arguing 
that trademarks are more monopolistic than patents. He def ines dif ferentiation as follows:  
“Dif ferentiation may be based upon certain characteristics of  the product itse lf , such as 
exclusive patented features; trade-marks; trade names; peculiarities of  the package or 
container, if  any; or singularity in quality, design, color, or style. It may also exist with 
respect to the conditions surrounding its sale.”32 
 
These represent the principal variables which competitors may adjust in terms of  their “product.” 
Adjusting the “conditions surrounding sale” implies that the variables available to the seller or 
producer includes the specif ic process of distribution. Including conditions surrounding sale 
allows Chamberlin to note that all products are at least slightly dif ferentiated and thus all 
competition should be viewed as monopolistic. There is no such thing as an absolute monopoly 
“as long as there are substitute [p roducts] to any degree imperfect, he still has a monopoly of his 
own product and control over its price within the limits imposed upon any monopolist —those of 
demand.”33 Real world prices represent an individual position between monopoly and competition 
which is “determined with reference to the relative strength of  the two forces”—a “purely 
competitive price is not a normal price.”34 The argument is that monopoly, as far as Chamberlin 
understands it, does not imply higher prices than similar products, “nor prof its higher than the 
ordinary rate.”35  
Chamberlin’s discussion of  patents and trademarks sets the stage for his “special market” 
concept. Given that trademarks and advertising are important tools of  corporate strategy, a 
concept important in our discussion of  Schumpeter, we will highlight Chamberlin’s contributions 
here. Chamberlin argues that patents, while clearly monopolistic for specific components of  
articles, are usually only ef fective at shutting out competition for near substitutes when all the 
important patents are acquired by a single f irm, with only less perfect substitutes providing 
 
32 Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), p. 56. 
 
33 Ibid., p. 65 - 67.  
 
34 Ibid., p. 64. 
 




competition. In addition to this limitation in the monopoly elements of  patents, they can also be 
considered to generate further competitive forces through the incentive to obtain the patent itself . 
 Chamberlin goes against the general view that trademarks are less monopolistic than 
patents and cites Allyn Young by saying a f irm:  
“...may be able to lif t himself  a little above the “dead level” of  competition [thro ugh 
trademarks]...he is...able to obtain what might be called a quasi-monopoly. But because 
the control the price of  his product is in general much more limited than a true 
monopolist, and because competition limits and conditions his activities in other ways, his 
business is more properly called competitive than monopolistic.”36  
 
Chamberlin, at this stage in his argument, cites f ive specif ic brands whose trade marks are clearly 
so valuable 1933 as to question the general assumption that patents are more p owerful than 
trademarks. It is interesting to observe that three of  the f ive brands he cites in 1933, Coca-cola, 
Kodak, and Ivory (introduced by Proctor and Gamble in 1879), were owned by 3 f irms in the top 
15 most wealth generating f irms between 1926 and 1970. Two of  the f ive remain in the top 15 
through 2017. The f irm to drop out of  the top 15 was Kodak, established in 1888 and holding a 
huge market position in f ilm and cameras until the 1980s when it was unable to transition its 
business with the advent of  digital photography and foreign competition. The f irm is now 
considered a classic example of  Schumpeterian creative destruction.  
The traditional theory of  monopolistic pricing focuses on a single f irm’s equilibrium. A 
theory of  monopolistic competition must refer to a “group equilibrium” of  dif ferent monopolies.37 
Chamberlin’s goal is to “give weight” to the “degree of  isolation that exists by focusing attention 
on the market of  the individual seller.”38 
Chamberlin presents two models, a large group monopolistic competition model and a 
small group, or oligopoly, model. In his formal models, the degree of  separation, which results in 
sales levels, are limited to three variables: price, product and advertising expenses. Allowing for 
product as a qualitative variable is novel—although Schumpeter will argue this is not enough—as 
 
36 Richard T. Ely and Young A. Allyn, Outlines of Economics, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1919), p. 
196. 
 
37 Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competition, p. 69.  
 




is his inclusion of  advertising outlays, which also introduces numerous theoretical dif f iculties. The 
product variable encompasses: “technical changes, a new design, or better materia ls; it may 
mean a new package or container; it may mean more prompt or courteous services, a dif ferent 
way of  doing business, or perhaps a new location.”39 Chamberlin is aware of  the limitations of  this 
approach and notes that qualitative variations of  a p roduct cannot be captured on a single 
diagram—one might realistically question if  it can be captured on diagrams at all. 40  
The ability to shif t demand by advertising exists because of  imperfect knowledge of  
buyers and the possibility of altering wants by advertising. It also ends the independence of  the 
supply curve on the demand curve, which Chamberlin recognizes. To arrive at a group 
equilibrium, prices and products must be varied. Prices may be adjusted for product, product may 
be adjusted for prices, although prices are assumed to be “of ten a relatively unimportant phase” 
in the competitive process. “Price competition is evaded by turning the buyer’s attention towards 
a trade-mark, or by competing on the basis of  quality or service” or by advertising. 41 The complete 
picture of  competition would see every element of  product subject to adjustment—and this 
includes, to emphasize, location, price, quality, service, etc. There can be a heterogeneity of  
prices in the market because of  the nature of  product variations—not to mention dif ferences in 
cost curves and elasticities of  demand.42 Variations here are assumed to be temporary and are 
viewed as constantly being eliminated. Chamberlin’s focus is those relationships which “persist 
over a long period of  time,” although the results of  any market are unique—“imperfections of  
competition [are] not uniform.”43 This is to say, competition is always leveling boh prof its and 
product dif ferentiation.  
 
39 Ibid., p. 71.  
 
40 Ibid., p. 78-79.  
 
41 Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competition, p. 73.  
 
42 Ibid., p. 81.  
 




If  new competition “invades” an existing market and market share cannot be “wrested 
f rom them with equal facility,” or if  some markets are “virtual ly unaf fected by an invasion of  the 
general f ield,” he writes, “[then] their monopoly prof its are beyond the reach of  competition.’44 He 
concludes that these variations “give no real dif f iculty in the end.”  
Chamberlin’s large group model is designed to replace perfect competition models. His 
less well developed small group model is his oligopoly model. To obtain his results in both cases, 
Chamberlin waves away increasing returns by assuming all f irms have the same cost structures. 
He assumes that prof its are set at the level which is “just adequate to maintain the amount” of  
competition, to avoid introducing new competition since there is f ree entry. 45 This latter point 
becomes an important matter of  debate but our intention is not to critique Chamberlin. A ll of  this, 
of  course, implies that there are ef fective substitute products. For us, this is the crux of  the matter.  
If  substitutes, however, are not ef fective, then prof its may still be higher—and “this is the 
explanation of  all monopoly profits, of whatever sort,” he writes.46 In this domain appears to be 
the types of  f irms responsible for the extreme returns highlighted in Bessembinder. The items 
that, to Chamberlin, can prevent substitute competing products are: (1) strong customer 
preferences combined with patents, copyrights and trademarks, (2) “peculiarities'' of  the 
establishment which cannot be duplicated, (3) “reputation, skill and special ability.”47 Chamberlin 
then says that “the competitive theory of  rent explains dif ferences in income in so far as they arise 
f rom such a source” but “further dif ferences are accounted for only by the theory of  monopoly.”48 
These elements result in “limitations on the ef fectiveness of  substitutes to diminish prof its within 
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It would seem that Chamberlin’s analysis is inapplicable to our problems since it appears 
to put the few extreme corporate wealth creators outside of  his theory. He puts their analysis into 
the theory of  competitive rents. Only his notion of  product differentiation and his f inal comments 
about markets where perfect substitutes are prevented are useful in explaining the results of  
Bessembinder. By pointing to the theory of  rents, however, an important question is raised: how 
are f irms which experience competitive rents regulated in the long run? Ultimately, in a 
painstaking 1937 review of  the marginalist theories of  imperfect competition, John Hick’s 
concludes that their applicability to practical analysis is limited.50  
  
 
50 J. R. Hicks, “Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly,” Econometrica 3, no. 1 (1935): pp. 1-20, 





4. Dynamic Models of Competition 
Straf fa’s comments on increasing returns were part of  a broader discussion which was 
held throughout the 1920s, referred to today as the cost controversies. These debates stimulated 
Allyn Young to express his own views around increasing returns while examining the division of  
labor, progress and the extent of  the market. Embedded within his views are the faint outlines of  a 
theory of  enterprise, industries and competition in the context of  increasing returns. The viewpoint 
expressed is a realistic model of  disequilibrium, entrepreneurs and expectations. We begin with 
Young because of  his close association with Knight’s thesis on uncertainty and because he is 
developing a dynamic model where progress is closely associated with increasing returns, a view 
like Schumpeter’s writings of  the same month in 1928. Both men are discussing increasing 
returns as the source of  progress within a dynamic model, albeit with dif ferent p oints of  emphasis.  
Young and Schumpeter’s view of  progress and increasing returns represent the actual 
environment which Frank Knight is seeking to explain in his discussion of  real world prof its, 
imperfect competition and the epistemic problems facing economic actors, most notably, the 
problem of  uninsurable and unforeseeable change or fundamental uncertainty. Uncertainty 
comes f rom rapid economic change, which, as Dobb argues more explicitly, comes f rom 
entrepreneurs creating new divisions of  labor and thereby increasing returns. The problem of  
uncertainty, arising f rom increasing returns and change, becomes the most critical aspect of  any 
dynamic competitive model.  
Dobb’s contribution in this essay is his theory of  competitive rents, which Chamberlin may 
have in mind when he brief ly refers to them. Dobb’s discussion is relevant because it raises the 
question of  how prof it positions are maintained and he answers that they are maintained by 
slowing the response of  competition through “advantages” cumulatively derived f rom supplying a 
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scarce resource. Despite notions of  cumulation, Dobb’s analysis is still set in an equilibrium world, 
with dynamic elements. Importantly, in Dobbs analysis, Knight and early Schumpeter are merely 
short run theories explaining prof its before the increase in competition—these theories still need 
to deal with what one might call the middle and long period of  competition.  
Finally, we will turn to Schumpeter and show how his later work is an elaboration and 
reaction to the ideas so far presented with the addition of  a concept of  business strategy to 
manage the fundamental uncertainty which is the result of  progressive and widespread increasing 
returns, allowing, as they do, for the creation of  new entrepreneurs, new strategies and new 
markets.  
We will argue that Schumpeter’s theory of  regulative strategy implies that f irm’s act in an 
instrumentally rational way to manage the fundamental uncertainty of  investment and that 
Schumpeter’s theory of  competition best explains the actual his tory of  competition, market 
structures, and the long run positive skew of  returns on f inancial capital as demonstrated in US 
capital markets. This is to say, Schumpeter’s theory, understood in its proper intellectual context, 
represents the most f lexible theory to explain the stylized facts which have been derived f rom 
Bessembinder and our extension of  Bessembinder.  
 The regulative strategy which f irms follow in the Schumpeterian competitive process is a 
means to continuously and progressively lower the fundamental uncertainty facing prof its on 
investment. In the short run, prof its emerge due to better anticipations and innovation. They are 
then maintained through strategy, as elaborated in Dobb and Schumpeter. Assuming prof it 
positions are maintained the question is, then, of  how is capital and prof its regulated in the long 
run, af ter protections of  profit positions have been built up? This question appears to be only 
answered clearly by Schumpeter, where he draws on his analysis of  monopolistic competition,  
uncertainty and increasing returns. The regulating force in the long run of  monopolistically 
competitive capitalism is “creative destruction.” We will argue that creative destruction can only 
be understood as the theoretical complement of  regulative strategies to manage uncertainty 
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driven by the increasing returns environment. Together they form a dynamic theory of  competition 
which can fulf ill the traditional role of  competition in economic theory. 
4.1 Allyn Young  
Allyn Young’s 1928 essay on economic progress and increasing returns represented a 
view he had been harboring since helping Frank Knight with his PhD thesis in the 1910s. 51 Young 
does not believe that economic progress, and specif ically the phenomenon of  increasing returns, 
can be understood in the context of  equilibrium.52 Internal economies of  scale which a f irm is able 
to achieve by increasing output, to take the most simple example, can be used to lower the price 
of  their product, which lowers the cost of  inputs for other f irms, resulting in external economies for 
that f irm and a continuous process of  disequilibrium. Schumpeter voices similar opinions in his 
“The Instability of  Capitalism” published in September 1928, the month of  Young’s speech.  
Young’s views can be seen as, in part, f illing out the background conditions for Knight’s 
views on uncertainty, as well as providing a technical compliment to Schumpeter’s point of  view 
on innovation. For Young, increasing returns through the division of  labor are the source of  
general progress and a source of  disequilibrium. Young’s differences f rom Schumpeter’s point of  
view are largely in terms of  emphasis and semantics: Young focuses on market size and how it 
enables new roundabout methods of  production, whereas Schumpeter focuses on 
entrepreneurship as leadership and the introduction of  new things in the circular f low. 
Schumpeter categorizes most “increasing returns” under the heading of  “innovation,” writing that: 
“Innovation, unless it consists in producing, and forcing upon the public, a new commodity, 
means producing at [a] smaller cost per unit, breaking of f  the old "supply schedule" and starting 
on a new one.”53  
 
51 Charles P. Blitch, Allyn Young: The Peripatetic Economist. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 
1996), p. 169.  
 
52 Allyn A. Young, “Increasing Returns and Economic Progress,” The Economic Journal 38, no. 152 (1928): p. 527, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2224097, 527. 
 
53 Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Instability of Capitalism (London, UK: Macmillan, 1928), p. 378. Schumpeter also 
addresses the increasing returns debate here by noting that decreasing returns only exist in a static model due to the 
assumption of diminishing returns from drawing on a set of fixed factors. That is all. Increasing returns which can result in 
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For Young, not all of  the economies which can be called “external” to one f irm can be 
accounted for as internal to other f irms, since some of  these economies are driven f rom 
qualitative improvements in product and the division of  labor. Efficiencies which are external to a 
f irm are both quantitative, in the simple sense of  the already mentioned internal economies of  
scale passed along f rom suppliers, as well as qualitative in the sense of  the structure of  the 
external economy itself ; in other words, economies f rom new products and new methods of  
production or organization. This disequilibrium, he writes, is characteristic of  the economy 
external to a f irm.54 
The most important economies which result in increasing returns are “capitalistic” or 
“round about” economies.55 The forces which would bring the economy to equilibrium are 
“continuously defeated” by economies of  scale, as well as being defeated by “new or adventitious 
elements.”56 Young writes:  
“Every important advance in the organisation of  production, regardless of  whether it is 
based upon anything which, in a narrow or technical sense, would be called a new 
‘invention,’ or involves a f resh application of  the f ruits of  scientific progress to industry, 
alters the conditions of industrial activity and initiates responses elsewhere in the 
industrial structure which in turn have a further unsettling ef fect. Thus change becomes 
progressive and propagates itself  in a cumulative way.”57 
 
Young notes that even if  we suppose a f rictionless, perfectly economical process not requiring 
trial and error, there will be a limiting pace with which progress can be made, partially limited by 
the capital accumulation necessary to advance methods and products, and partially limited 
because: 
 “...the demand for some products is inelastic, or, with an increasing supply, soon 
becomes so...In most f ields, moreover, progress is not and cannot be continuous. The 
next important step forward is of ten initially costly, and cannot be taken until a certain 
quantum of  prospective advantages have been accumulated.”58 
 
instability of a different order and are largely from innovation and indivisibilities. Decreasing and increasing returns simply 
are not symmetrical concepts. Schumpeter’s solution to the Marshallian cost controversies is to separate the increasing 
and decreasing returns debate to their respective spheres of dynamic and static analysis.  
 
54 Young, Increasing Returns, p. 528.  
 
55 Ibid., p. 530-531. 
 








A certain “quantum of  prospective advantages” being required for new investment will be echoed 
by Schumpeter and it is fair to view this as a theoretical concept which has its analytic function in 
a dynamic or development theory where investment faces fundamental uncertainty and requires 
inducements to overcome this uncertainty.59  
While noting that one shouldn’t assign a single factor to the leading role in economic 
progress, Young asks: “is there any other factor which has a better claim to that role than the 
persistent search for markets? No other hypothesis so well unites economic history and economic 
theory.”60 
Af ter the historic transition f rom commerce to industry in the industrial revolution, Young 
writes, commerce became an agent of  industry and now the “f inding of  markets” is an important 
task of  industry. This represents one of  Young's important views, crucial to understanding the 
relationship between roundabout specialization, allowing for increasing returns, and market size. 
He had already taken this position in a chapter written in 1924 titled “The creator of  wealth” where 
the title refers to trade - not invention, land or labor.61  
 Thus, the search for new markets to reach scale, combined with a certain quantum of  
advantages, is required for new capitalistic and roundabout means of  production. Young writes of  
this theory of  enterprise:  
“The great change, I imagine, is in the new importance which the potential market has in 
the planning and management of  large industries...Potential demand, then, in the 
planning of  industrial undertakings, has to be balanced against potential economies, 
elasticity of  demand against decreasing costs. The search for markets is  not a matter of  
disposing of a “surplus product,” in the Marxian sense, but of  f inding an outlet for a 
potential product. Nor is it wholly a matter of  multiplying prof its by multiplying sales; it is 
partly a matter of  augmenting prof its by reducing costs. ..How far ‘selling expenses,’ for 
example, are to be counted [in] economic waste depends upon their ef fects upon the 
 
 
59 One can contrast this concept with Steindl where investment is induced when there appears to be a sufficient premium 
return over the estimates of risk. Risk in Steindl refers to the variance of return, which can only be calculated on repeated 
and similar business decisions. With “the next step forward” there is no means of classifying the variance of returns. 
Although he does not use the term, Young is referring to “innovations” - defined as novel elements in the circular flow - 
and these do not have a historical basis upon which to generalize about the variance of returns. 
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aggregate product of  industry, as distinguished f rom their ef fects upon the fortunes of  
particular undertakings.”62 
 
Clearly, here are the outlines of  a theory of  enterprise and its relationship to industry, together 
forming a partial picture of  the competitive process. The scale of  the end market determines what 
types of  division of  labor, or specialization and roundabout methods, can be emp loyed. He writes:  
“The degree in which [a f irm] can secure economies by making its own operations more 
roundabout is limited. But certain roundabout methods are fairly sure to become feasible 
and economic when their advantages can be spread over the output of  the whole 
industry. These potential economies, then, are segregated and achieved by the 
operations of  a specialized undertakings which, taken together, constitute a new 
industry.“63 
 
Specialist f irms can become suppliers or vendors to an existing industry by providing a service 
which is more ef f icient than that which could be provided by any individual f irms in that industry 
internally—that is, only specialists can achieve certain economies of  scale by providing their 
service to the industry as a whole, as only this scale of  end market allows for these types of  
economies of  scale.  
 The search for potential markets—with selling costs and advertising—is not just about 
shif ting the demand curve, problematic in terms of  any static analysis, but to achieve potential 
economies of  scale in the context of  specializing f irms. Unlike in Chamberlin where advertising 
exists to alter preferences, and selling costs are relegated to costs in production f rom 
dif ferentiation, the implication in Young is that advertising exists to expand and ef f iciently tap a 
potential market for a f irm’s products. Young’s views correspond to the later views of  Philip 
Andrews, as well as to academic business history.64 This allows for a more capitalistic processes 
 
62 Ibid., p. 536 - 537. This last line points to a common refrain heard from small firms in new markets where a large 
competitor begins moving into the market, beginning with a large advertising campaign. It is not uncommon to hear these 
small firms say that they believe their large competitor’s new marketing campaigns will rather expand the entire market for 
both their products and, thus, may make their own selling process more efficient, rather than take away share in a zero-
sum manner.  
 
63 Ibid., p. 539.  
 
64 Philip Andrews views are expressed in a number of places, for instance, in his 1952 Netherlands lectures. See The 
Economics of Competitive Enterprise: Selected Essays of P.W.S. Andrews, p. 217. For references in academic business 
history, see The History of Unilever: A Study In Economic Growth and Social Change. There the economies from 
advertising are described as bringing the same concept of machine repetition to selling by reducing expensive frictions in 
the process of the sale. It is designed to lower the average unit cost of selling and distribution expenses, incl uding those 
of the final distributor, since this will make the manufacturer’s goods more attractive to distribute. As well, in this business 
history, advertising expenses are not considered to be paid for by existing consumers but only through an increase in 
sales. For competitive reasons, if advertising expenses succeed in increasing sales, it effectively generates a reserve or 
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of  production, allowing for increasing returns at the f irm level and, assuming these ef f iciencies are 
propagated to their customers, altering the budget composition for customers. This is the realistic 
environment which allows for new combinations f rom a continuously changing environment of  
long term payof fs.  
It is fair to view Young’s dynamic model of  increasing returns as a model of  circular and 
cumulative causation where, quoting Toner, “growth in productivity and growth in output are 
interdependent and self -reinforcing.”65  
Frank Knight wrote to Allyn Young about this paper saying that he should have made a 
clearer distinction between static and dynamic models.66 To this Young replied that: 
 “...[the] purely static view does not interest me very much, because if  it is rigorously 
adhered to, almost everything worth saying about it can be put onto a few page...I should 
hold that the conditions of  an equilibrium rate of  change af ford just as appropriate a 
hunting ground for ‘pure theory’ as the conditions of  static equilibrium do.”67  
 
Young never got a chance to elaborate on this idea and throw it into some “simple and stable 
mechanism,” or to work f rom a “generalization to the facts and f rom the facts back to new 
generalizations in a way which blends deduction and induction,” as he once described the work of  
an economist.68 There is, however, a whole approach here where, as biographer Charles Blitch 
puts it, “growth is demand-determined, with increases in the size of  the market generating capital 
investment, external economies and increasing returns, which in turn, expand the market so that 
the process is cumulative.”69 There are, as well, outlines of  a theory of  competition where f irms 
plan for potential markets and potential economies of  scale. Employing selling costs and 
 
buffer which, in times of stress, can be reduced without a sacrifice of sales for a limited period. See Charles Wilson, The 
History of Unilever: a Study in Economic Growth and Social Change (London, England: Cassell, 1970), p. 57 - 58.  
 
65 Phillip Toner, Main Currents in Cumulative Causation: the Dynamics of Growth and Development (Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Macmillan, 1999), p. 162. 
 




68 Allyn A. Young, “Economics as a Field of Research,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 42, no. 1 (1927): p. 1, 
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advertising are necessary to expand its market so as to obtain the scale required to employ 
capitalistic and roundable strategies to achieve these economies. 
4.2 Frank Knight 
 When Frank Knight was writing his thesis in the years before 1921, he wrote that the 
theory of  perfection competition requires increasing costs because, if  not, a f irm could scale to 
absolute monopoly by achieving increasing returns to scale—Cournot’s position, in other words. 
In such a situation, perfect competition requires new supply to come in the form of  new f irms, he 
claimed. Allyn Young, his adviser, pointedly noted that some economies are only possibly f rom a 
large demand, most importantly economies f rom “highly specialized establishments,” and that:  
“I dif fer f rom your notion of decreasing costs. I hold them to be real, not necessarily 
tending to monopoly, and one of  the most important economic phenomenon of  modern 
times. They are not a matter of  ‘proportioning of factors.’ They are, in great part, a matter 
of  the economies of  the division of labor, which as Adam Smith observed, is limited by 
the ‘extent of  the market.’”70 
 
Knight’s views, however, were that specialization and the division of  labor—and consequently 
increasing returns, progress and history—are a theme outside of  static theory. Instead, it is part of  
dynamic theory, which Knight later suggests we call evolutionary theory or historical theory. 71  
His Ph.D. thesis introduces another important element of  realism which, when combined 
with and understood in context of  Young’s increasing returns, lay the groundwork for better 
understanding Schumpeter’s theory of  monopolistic competition. Knight writes that the “pro blem 
of  prof it is one way of  looking at the problem of  the contrast between perfect competition and 
actual competition,” with the greater part of  his thesis being focused on how imperfect competition 
and prof it arise due to uncertainty.72 One result of  his thesis was the widely accepted def initions 
 
70 Ibid., p. 169-70. 
 
71 Frank Knight, “Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 38, no. 4 
(1924): p. 582, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884592. R. Marchionatti, “On the Methodological Foundations of Modern 
Microeconomics: Frank Knight and the ‘Cost Controversy’ in the 1920s,” History of Political Economy 35, no. 1 (January 
2003): pp. 49-75, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-35-1-49, 70. See also Frank Knight, “Statics And Dynamics,” The 
Ethics of Competition, August 2017, pp. 153-177, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351304009-6, p. 176. 
 




of  “risk” as foreseeable, regular, measurable and insurable change, and “uncertainty” as 
immeasurable, unforeseeable and uninsurable change.  
Fundamental uncertainty is the result of  rapid economic change which, as Dobb will 
argue more explicitly than Knight, comes f rom entrepreneurs who further the division of  labor, 
resulting in increasing returns. This rapid economic change continuously alters the f ield of  play 
wherein adaptation and correct anticipation explains short run prof its.  
Knight’s def initions of  risk and uncertainty were widely applied af ter his book, for 
instance, in Keynes’ The General Theory.73 Prior references to “risk” in the literature, such as in 
Smith, Mill and Marx, refer to both risk and uncertainty. Further def initional cleaves have been 
suggested, for instance, in the last book by Hicks and Dequech.74 Arrow writes that Knightian 
uncertainty might potentially be def ined as when it is impossible to determine priors in a Baysian 
context.75 This essay cannot explore these and other reactions. The focus here is on the 
exploration of  imperfect competition in Frank Knight where prof its and imperfect market structures 
arise due to the fact of  more or less able actors encountering the epistemic problems of  
fundamental uncertainty, including the uncertainty f rom hierarchical ef fects in management’s 
ability to judge other people’s ability to manage uncertainty. 
In looking at how actual markets deviate f rom perfect markets, change as such needs to 
be seperated f rom unforeseeable change, as only the latter can create opportunities for 
dif ferences in ability to better anticipate the future. Knight writes that,  
“We live only by knowing something about the future; while the problems of  life, or of  
conduct at least, arise f rom the fact that we know so little… The essence of  the situation 
is action according to opinion, of  greater or less foundation and value, neither entire 
ignorance nor complete and perfect information, but partial knowledge.”76  
 
73 There is a deeper connection with Keynes in that, up to that time, only Keynes’ Treatise on Probability (1919) 
presented, in addition to its mathematical approaches, a non-mathematical and subjective logic of probability through 
weights of evidence and degrees of confidence. It would appear that Keynes’ logic of probability would apply to Knightian 
“estimates” but we will not explore this here. 
 
74 John Hicks, A Market Theory of Money (New York, NY: Oxford University press, 1991), p. 142. David Dequech, 
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75 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations,” Econometrica 19, no. 4 
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Knight spends a great deal of  time writing about the problems of  “action according to opinion,” 
about how we have an imperfect image of  the world in our minds and that when we act, we 
project an imagined future extending out f rom our already imperfectly imaged state of  the world. 
On this basis, we make guesses about how our actions will change this imagined future.  
The implication is that we estimate the results of  our actions imperfectly and, even then, 
only f rom one imagined state of  the world to another imagined state. In addition to the challenges 
which must arise in such a process, we also simply error once we decide to take action. What is 
presented to consciousness, in Knight, is “more a product of  inference, more an imaginative 
construct than a direct communication” with reality.77  
 The problem is one of  the human mind encountering the fact that the future is yet to be 
created and that the important factors and inf luences are unknown in the present. His discussion 
touches on the subjects of  probability, noting that consequential business decisions cannot be 
statistical because they cannot be classif ied into groups f rom which one is able to establish 
regularities and, of  course, business decisions are dif ferent f rom the logical deductive or a priori 
probabilities found in games. Business decisions, like the decisions in common life, are made 
with rough estimates of  the future—”estimate of  an estimate”—and their nature is that there is “no 
valid basis of  any kind for classifying instances.”78 And these estimates, however, are not without 
some dif ferences in ability between business men—for Knight’s theory is, in part, built on the 
basis of  there being dif ferences in ability in encountering uncertainty. “It is,” Knight writes , “this 
true uncertainty which by preventing the theoretically perfect outworking of  the tendencies of  
competition gives characteristic form of  “enterprise” to economic organization as a whole and 
accounts for the peculiar income of  the entrepreneur.”79 
 
77 Ibid., p. 202.  
 
78 Ibid., p. 225.  
 




In this context, rational action necessitates taking steps to reduce the uncertainty: “...in 
attempting to act “intelligently” we are attempting to secure adaptation, which means foresight, as 
perfect as possible.”80 These methods include (1) grouping of  cases or decisions, (2) specializing 
in making certain types of  decisions, (3) control over the future, (4) increased power of  prediction, 
e.g., through better information and (5) methods of  dif fusing the costs of mistakes. 81 He observes 
that the economic system is designed so that the producer forecasts the needs of  its customers in 
advance, rather than working f rom the basis of  customer orders, and the producer is able to do 
this because it is producing for a statistical market whose behavior is more predictable than any 
given purchaser within this market.82 It is also worth observing here that this taxonomy represents 
a means of  analyzing and classifying the “regulative strategies” of  Schumpeter’s monopolistic 
competition and, more importantly, in considering ways to limit the advantages  of  dominant f irms 
for purposes of  policy within existing law—for instance, by limiting the secrecy and informational 
advantages of  dominant f irms by forcing greater disclosure under existing securities laws, thereby 
weakening their ability to have “contro l over the future” and providing information to competitors 
about investment opportunities they may be overlooking.  
Knight writes that the possibility of further grouping of  decisions subject to uncertainty 
constitute an additional incentive to the scaling  of  an enterprise, besides mere economies of  
scale. It may justify borrowings to extend business, if  it allows for greater scope and grouping of  
business decisions, making the uncertainty of  decisions less uncertain as a group. 83 
Specialization is a means of  increasing and grouping the decisions made by a specif ic f irm, 
manager or entrepreneur. By specializing in certain types of  decisions, the quality of  decisions will 
increase through practice. Knight overlooks it but, it is clear, increased scale and number of  
 
80 Ibid., p. 238.  
 
81 Ibid., p. 243-244.  
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decisions under an improving decision maker would amount to an “increasing return” due to the 
sharpening of  specialization and the better grouping of  decisions.  
The most powerful “methods for dealing with uncertainty [is] by securing better 
knowledge of  and control over the future.”84 This may be f rom having better information about 
what is going on in the economic system. It may be in terms of  the ability to shape the future by 
shaping expectations with actions, e.g., through demoralizing investments. Furthermore, f irms 
f requently acquire through merger innovative competitors, typically incorporating the new of fering 
within their own business or product, thereby controlling new innovation in their market through 
acquisition. 
At this point in Knight’s argument, all of  the aforementioned problems are scaled up to 
the problem that entrepreneurs must themselves select managers who they believe will be good 
at managing fundamental uncertainty. “Business judgment,” he writes, “is chief ly judgment of  
men.”85 Specialization occurs to ensure that those who are best able to manage uncertainty are 
placed in the responsible position to do so.  
 Prof its arise, in this model, f rom uncertainty and f rom some managers better anticipating 
their markets. For Knight, the income of  society is divided between contractual incomes, or rent, 
and residual incomes, i.e., prof its.86 “The entrepreneur’s income is not ‘determined’ at all,” he 
writes, “it is ‘what is lef t’ af ter the others are ‘determined.’”87 Making prof its rests on believing you 
can contract services in advance, guaranteeing payment, and then securing a market in a way 
which produces a residual. This anticipated excess—the prof it or residual—is a matter of  the 
correctness of  judgment or the failure of  judgment on the part of  his competitors. 88 These prof its 
need not have some specif ic relationships with the capital required to obtain them since they are 
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merely a residual of  correctly anticipating a market and having previously contracted for services. 
In summation, Knight writes: 
“the background element of  the problem should now be clear: the uncertainty of  all life 
and conduct which calls for the exercise of  judgment in business, the economy of  division 
of  labor which compels men to work in groups and to delegate function of  control as other 
functions are specialized, the facts of  human nature which make it necessary for one who 
directs the activities of  others to assume responsibility for the results of  operations, and 
f inally the competitive situation which pits the judgment of  each entrepreneur against that 
of  the extent business world in adjusting the contractual incomes which he must pay 
before he gets anything himself .”89 
 
The residual prof it for any f irm is the result of  making payments to factors at the established 
competitive rates and selling at the highest value obtainable in their own market. Fundamentally, 
in Knight, this comes f rom better anticipation of  their market.  
When it comes to the level of  prof it across industry, Knight writes that the main ef fect 
here is the: 
“...rashness or timidity of  entrepreneurs (actual or potential) as a class in bidding up the 
prices of  productive services. Entrepreneur income, being residual, is determined by the 
demand for other services, which demand is a matter of  the self -conf idence of  
entrepreneurs as a class, rather than upon a demand for entrepreneur services in a direct 
sense.”90 
 
Clearly, there is a resemblance here between those ideas derived by accounting identity, such as 
in Kalecki and Steindl, where entrepreneurial prof its are determined by entrepreneurial 
investment, less their consumption. Furthermore, this “self -conf idence of  entrepreneurs” is 
undoubtedly the “state of  conf idence” or the “animal spirits" within “the state of  long term 
expectations” of  Keynes. 
 At this juncture, it is appropriate to note that, in this theory of  prof its, entrepreneurs would 
need to have a continuous stream of  correct judgments about the future for prof its to continue to 
emerge. That is to say, Knight’s explanation of  prof its is a short run theory only. It is a theory of  
prof it f rom change, not a theory of  prof it from “risk.” Schumpeter writes that Knight’s conception of  
prof it and uncertainty, combined with an analysis of  dif ferential ability “achieved a synthesis that 
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is not open to the main objection against the ordinary type of  risk theories” and that “[a] further 
step in the same direction was taken by Dobb.”91 Schumpeter later refers to Knight and Dobb side 
by side and it will be seen that Schumpeter’s theory of  “regulating strategies” can be considered a 
variation of  Dobb’s ideas around how f irms slow or restrict the response of  competition.  
4.3 Maurice Dobb 
Monopoly advantages, in Dobb’s Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress , exist when 
there is a “dif ferential advantage, due to superior opportunity” f rom being a supplier of  scarce 
service.92 “Deliberate or intentional monopoly” are actions designed to render or keep something 
scarce—although this is not to say that the situation is less of  a welfare ideal than that which was 
previously obtained. Having these advantages f rom scarcity allows for additive advantages in 
bargaining and, combined, result in a slower response f rom competition, allowing for any prof its 
initially obtained through an entrepreneur better anticipating the market  a la Knight to be kept 
above the level of  prof its which would be obtained under long run perfect competition. Dobb 
writes that “monopoly...is the Aladdin’s lamp to wealth...the history of  the growth of  riches will be 
in large part the history of  monopoly in its development in various forms.”93 
Dobb later says that Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress, his f irst book, was 
“unsuccessful and jejune” in trying to express “Marxist insights with a Marshallian vocabulary” but 
it nevertheless appears to be a worthwhile attempt of  formulating a concept of  persistent 
“competitive rent” such as that referred to above in Chamberl in.94 The analysis can also be 
criticized for not thoroughly separating the static and dynamic modes of  analysis, which is explicit 
in Knight and Schumpeter. It is worthwhile to overlook this, in our view, so as to focus on how 
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f irms may slow the response of  competition in a context of  Knightian uncertainty and Knightian 
prof its.  
Monopolistically competitive market structures, for Dobb, do not imply that resources are 
distributed farther f rom ideal than they otherwise would be because, he writes, a monopol istically 
competitive f irm may facilitate a new division of  labor.95 Therefore, a monopolistically competitive 
f irm may be constructive in that sense, as well potentially being destructive through the process 
of  restricting output or competition. They may be benef icial in youth and harmful in old age. 
The entrepreneur in Dobb anticipates a potential market under conditions of uncertainty, 
like in Frank Knight, although with greater emphasis on novelty and the creation of  new divisions 
of  labor, as in Schumpeter and Young. Rapid economic change arises f rom the actions of  
entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs' gains are f rom being a pioneer and providing a new service 
through the division of  labor. Echoing Knight he writes:  
“Uncertainty will occur when the course o f  events is incalculable or unforeseeable; and it 
will be economic change, introducing something new, which will contain the greatest 
incalculable element. Every kind of  economic activity will be exposed to the occurrence of  
economic losses.”96 
 
Uncertainty, being generated by the actions of  innovative entrepreneurs, creates: “a future that is 
dif ferent f rom the past [and] cuts away the basis—generalizations f rom past experience—for a 
calculation of  future probabilities.”97 Progress depends on the willingness to make judgments on 
the basis of  “meagre evidence”—it can be seen as non-ergodic.  
 Dobb sees Knight’s analysis as a Marshallian short period analysis where the supply of  
competitors is f ixed, allowing for these better anticipations to create temporary  prof its. In the long 
period, Dobb argues, there would remain a tendency for prof its to be “normal,” or rather “they will 
tend to that level which is suf f icient to attract the requisite competition.”98 The actual level of  
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prof its in this model would be determined by the Marshallian “supply-price” of  entrepreneurs. If  
the “price” must be high to stimulate competition, profits will be high. Dobb continues:  
“...the chief  consideration in f inding the cause of  supply -price of  [entrepreneurs], and 
hence of  the level of  prof its in general and in particular industries, is the ease or dif f iculty 
with which new undertakers are forthcoming—the limitations on their supply.”99  
 
The elements which determine the “supply-price” of  entrepreneurs is the minimum supply-price 
and the elasticity or responsiveness of  this supply. The minimum supply -price can be thought of  
as the rate of  interest, the cost of  education of  the entrepreneur,  and the average expectation of  
prof its.  
Assuming this minimum is obtained, the responsiveness of  entrepreneurial competition or 
the responsiveness of  the supply—which, when slack, implies greater prof its—is determined by 
(1) the rarity of  the specif ic abilities required for some market, (2) education for the specif ics of 
the market, (3) the initial capital required for the undertaking being available, (4) lack of  
knowledge of  the market or the “the lack of  knowledge of  the true possibilities of undertaking 
except for the privileged few with ‘insider information,’” (5) legal protections or advantages, which 
we take to be inclusive of  trademarks, and (6) business connections and goodwill. 100 Since this 
last feature applies especially to large f irms with estab lished reputations, this gives established 
f irms an additional advantage when approaching new markets, e.g., “this very fact, by raising a 
new barrier to competition, places established f irms in a partially protected position.”101 Clearly, 
when the response of  entrepreneurs to prof its is slowed, due to a combination of  the above 
reasons, the apparently temporary prof its obtained in the Knightian sense persist.  
This analysis of  prof its turns to the idea of  dif ferential rents. All prices have within them 
some aspects of  rent f rom an imperfect response of  supply to demand and, thus, every market 
can be seen to have some degree of  inelasticity. This “dif ferential advantage...it seems 
convenient to describe as a scarcity or monopoly gain.”102 In addition to any advantages one has 
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f rom being able to supply a scarce resource, there are bargaining advantages, such as controlling 
the timing of  sale, superior information, greater facility in multiple markets, and scale. 103 
In this context, prof it is a species of  monopoly advantage and “prof it” is here inclusive of  
capital appreciation. The prof it will be due to the limitation on the facility of  supply or the 
responsiveness of  competition to high prices. In the context of  economic change, each of  these 
advantages become increasingly important. The entrepreneur is the disturber of  equilibrium, they 
are “a dynamic force itself , ef fecting new groupings of  resources with the aim of  lowering costs 
and widening the market to which he can supply utilities.”104 He writes:  
“When a change occurs which brings an increased net product to the economic system, 
the whole of  this gain at f irst accrues to the undertaker since he receives the margin 
between selling-price and cost. Only as the force of  competition reduces selling prices or 
raises costs will he be forced to part with this gain to other sections of  the community. A 
very important factor will, therefore, be the length of  time it takes for competition of new 
undertakers to have ef fect. The existence of  certain limitations on the entry of  new 
undertakers will tend to lengthen this period of  time…”105 
 
For Dobb, economists who only look at the long run of  equilibrium are missing the big picture. All 
these ef fects are cumulative, for instance, as in the access to credit. 106 The advantages which are 
gained have a tendency to “increase cumulatively, ceteris paribus.”107 By being able to borrow, 
the entrepreneur: 
“...has an increased power of  extending his business, securing economies of  
organization, building up a commercial connection and ‘goodwill,’ accumulating reserves 
against hard times or a competitive struggle, and facing larger uncertainties than he 
formally dared. This, in so far as it is general, may cause the monopoly position of 
existing undertakers to be strengthened through an increase in the limitations on the 
entry of  new rivals. Larger capital may be needed in the future for new men in that line of  
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Within this, one can see a number of  Knightian aspects come through—e.g., the ability to manage 
more uncertainty through scale. Marx, Dobb writes, charged 19th century economists as being 
blind to capital “as a transferable monopoly right, the product of  differential advantage, not of  
abstinence.”109 They were also blinded, he writes, “to the inf luence of  the cumulative tendency of  
monopoly in the development of  capitalist undertaking.”110 He continues:  
“They do not appear to have noticed (except in the case of  land) that the possession of  a 
dif ferential advantage opens opportunity of  securing additional advantages in the future, 
and may thereby cause the major gains of  social progress to be acquired by those 
possessed of  [these] property-rights.”111 
 
For the purposes of  this thesis, Dobb has provided a novel analysis of  competition 
overtime with a few important points of  emphasis. First, what matters for the medium and long 
term level of  profits is the responsiveness of  new supply or the responsiveness of  new 
competition to market prices which are all seen to contain an element of  rent. If  the response of  
competition is slowed, then prof its derived f rom better anticipating change and creating new 
divisions of  labor can be made to persist. Secondly, he has combined this with a notion of  
additional advantages f rom bargaining and maneuver, further slowing the ability of  a competitor to 
catch up. Third, he brings into context the cumulative aspects of  the competitive process.  
 Dobb’s later discussions of  monopolistic competition, for instance in his 1967 book 
Political Economy and Capitalism, neglect to mention his own earlier analysis as well as 
mentioning that much of  the work on imperfect competition, specifically advertising analysis, 
undermines both static equilibrium and subjective value theory. There he notes that the theories 
of  imperfect competition are of  three types: (1) theories that merely introduce a delay to the 
achieving the long term equilibrium of  perfect competition, (2) theories which of fer a new long 
term equilibrium which is determined in a new way, usually implying higher prof its than under 
perfect competition, or (3) theories which require a new concept of  equilibrium, perhaps along the 
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While Dobb’s analysis employs both static and dynamic elements, the direction here is 
useful, in part because it is written to further the analysis begun by Knight, in part because it 
raises the specif ic questions of delaying the elimination of  prof its in theoretical analysis. Since 
Schumpeter’s early analysis has much in common with Knight’s, his own concepts will need to 







5. The Dynamic Model of Schumpeter  
 Schumpeter shif ts f rom advocating mathematical approaches in the early 1930s to 
advocating economic history in the 1940s, shocking past students like Paul Samuelson. It is also 
in this later period, af ter studying the details of  business cycles in depth, that the concept of  
regulative strategy to conserve a stream of  prof its in the face of  creative destruction becomes part 
of  his competitive analysis.  
Schumpeter's advocacy of  history is not surprising given his starting point in The Theory 
of Economic Development which, as he wrote in the preface to the Japanese translation, was “to 
construct a theoretical model of  the process of  economic change in time” or to “answer the 
question of  how the economic system generates the force which incessantly transforms i t.”112 He 
notes that this intention, although not the result, is similar to Marx. The story goes that between 
his early work and his later work Schumpeter was more optimistic about the possibilities of 
equilibrium and mathematical approaches. Clearly, however, his feelings were already moving 
away f rom them in the mid-1930s, as in his review of  Joan Robinson’s work on imperfect 
competition where he writes “the time has probably come to get rid of  the apparatus of  supply and 
demand.”113  
Not only was it time to get rid of  supply and demand and embrace a dynamic theory but 
economic history is, Schumpeter writes in the introduction of  History of Economic Analysis, “by far 
the most important” fundamental f ield of  economics and that “most of  the fundamental errors 
currently committed in economic analysis are due to lack of  historical experience.”114 In one of  the 
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last essays, he laments the lack of  cooperation between economists and historians in what 
amounts to a plea for further research.115 Indeed, it is only in 1954, with Charles Wilson’s three 
volume The History of Unilever, when business history is established as a serious subject of  
intellectual interest. Alf red Chandler’s f irst work, Strategy and Structure, was only published in 
1962. One of  Schumpeter’s biographers has written that a competent editor could have turned 
Schumpeter’s Business Cycles into the f irst academic work on business history—but it was not to 
be.116 In the year before his death, Schumpeter’s relationship with history is clear when he writes 
that he believes “there is an incessant give and take between historical and theoretical analysis, 
though for investigation of  individual questions it may be necessary to sail for a time on one tack 
only.”117  
The theory of  competition presented in Schumpeter’s later work was developed in such a 
way as to successfully encounter the facts of  history by being robust enough to deal with their 
bewildering variety. Schumpeter was made aware of  this rich complexity as  he worked through 
the historical research which culminated in his Business Cycles. Few would see this work as a 
success but the historical research which went into it can be seen as setting the factual and 
historical constraints that a theory of  monopolis tic competition must encounter. This theory of  
competition, in the sense of  a theory of  competition which regulates the forces of  capitalism, is 
found in his most acclaimed work, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy . 
5.1 Competition in Theory of Economic Development 
His later model of  competition solves a problem shared with Knight and identif ied by 
Dobb, namely, that his f irst theory is a short run theory. In The Theory of Economic Development 
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changes are brought about by entrepreneurs combining factors into new and novel—hitherto 
unseen—arrangements. This is the entire def inition of  “innovation” and all further discussion 
evolves out of  that problems which arise f rom embarking on a new and untried path. 118 Clearly, 
innovation applies to a new product, a new variant of  product, a new method of  production, a new 
market, a new input, or a new method of  organization.119 The theory is that economic activity is 
set in motion by an entrepreneur making innovative investments—funded in his f irst theory and in 
Business Cycles by bank credit—and the overall system is one of  endogenous qualitative growth 
where any equilibriums that might exist are displaced in a discontinuous manner. The 
discontinuity, for Schumpeter, is a def ining feature of  a dynamic theory (in Schumpeter’s 
language, a “theory of  development”) as compared with a static theory.  
In his early work, new combinations “as a rule” are f rom new f irms and those carrying out 
combinations are “entrepreneurs,” separated f rom the “capitalist” who fund the enterprise and 
who risk their capital. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur must show leadership in the face of  a lack of  
data—i.e., uncertainty—regarding the future about which he can only guess.120 The success of  the 
enterprise depends upon “intuition, the capacity of  seeing things in a way which af terward proves 
to be true.”121 In this way the entrepreneur leads “the means of  production into new channels,” 
presumably shaping consumer budgets, undermining older f irms. Clearly, we have Schumpeter’s 
entrepreneur encountering fundamental uncertainty 10 years before Knight’s thesis.  
The problems with this analysis, prior to Schumpeter’s later modif ication, is that it doesn’t 
address the competitive process except by bringing out the development of  new and innovating 
enterprises—or, with Knight’s style of  emphasis, except by showing the importance of  better 
anticipations in the face of  uncertainty. The approach doesn’t deal very well, for instance, with 
what we might call the competitive response of  existing f irms to the new enterprise. The concept 
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of  innovation, as well, carries too great weight in the model and the theory of  prof its is essentially 
only a short run theory of  prof its from successful innovations. A continuity of profits would only 
arise f rom a continuous stream of  successful innovations. The similarities with Knight are clear 
with the caveat that Schumpeter is already discussing business planning, whereas Knight is 
overwhelmingly focused on the uncertainty of  specif ic decisions and the resulting or required 
structures.122 Both, however, are short run explanations.  
It is worth noting here that it is artif icial to remove Schumpeter’s early concept of  
competition f rom his theory of  cycles, since cycles can be seen as being driven by a swarm of  
entrepreneurs whose expectations are later upset. These entrepreneurs drive instability in the 
economic system by creating systems of  increasing returns, undermining old establishments, 
collectively over investing and thereaf ter causing a cluster of  errors. It is also necessary here to 
remain focused on micro elements and to exclude a discussion of  aggregates. Minsky has noted 
that prof its f rom competition in Schumpeter are in part driven by a cycle in aggregates, such as 
total credit, and that the Kaleckian prof it-investment accounting identity is latent in Schumpeter's 
work.123 Our focus here will be on the process of  competition at the f irm level.  
5.2 Competition in Business Cycles 
 While the systematic analysis of  the middle and long period of  the competitive process is 
developed in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy , certain aspects were beginning to form in 
Schumpeter’s Business Cycles. Here prof it is a “functional return” since it is a temporary, not a 
recurring, income. What is most important in the analysis are “the struggles to conserve the 
stream of  prof it itself.”124 He writes:  
“Secrecy regarding processes, patents, judicious dif ferentiation of  products, advertising, 
and the like, occasionally also aggression directed against actual and would -be 
competitors, are instances of  a familiar strategy, which in the public, as well as in the 
professional, mind have done much to veil the source and nature of  prof its in our sense, 
especially because that strategy may be resorted to in other cases as well.” 
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Writing in the wake of  Robinson and Chamberlin, one sees Schumpeter referring to business 
strategy, not so much as a separate component o f  his analysis, but rather a latent aspect of  
reality—the ”judicious dif ferentiation of  products, advertising,” he notes, “are instances of  a 
familiar strategy.” Still, he is saying that these features “veil the source and nature of  prof its” in his 
sense. What sense does Schumpeter mean? 
“It follows that prof its might, as far as this goes, be also included in the category of  
monopoloid gains. This, however, would blur the specif ic character in our case: not every 
generalization is prof itable to an analyst—anymore than every innovation is to an 
innovator. Moreover, prof its change their character in the course of  such struggles.  
Not only is practically every enterprise threatened and put on the defensive as 
soon as it comes into existence, but it also threatens the existing structure of  
industry…An innovation sometimes may do so by its mere possibility and even before it 
is embodied in an enterprise. That structure...resents the threat and perceives 
possibilities of defence other than adaptation by a competitive struggle which generally 
means death for many of  its units...Taking industry as a whole, there is always an 
innovating sphere waring with an “old” sphere, which sometimes tries to secure 
prohibition of  the new ways of  doing things...or to discredit them...or to buy them of f ...or 
penalize them.”125 
 
Despite the resistance of  the “old'' sphere, a paradox is that the competition forces the resistant 
old sphere to evolve and adopt new methods by the “law of  its own life.” The prof its which arise 
through this process are, it would seem, more tentative than the mere prof its from innovation 
found in Theory of Economic Development. They arise f rom innovating f irms which are able to 
persevere through the competitive struggle as old f irms go to war and seek to protec t their market 
positions by strategies of  defense or by adopting similar innovations. He notes that “prof its 
change their character in the course of  such struggles” which we take to mean that prof its f rom 
successful innovations are, in time, transformed into situations of  “imperfect competition” with 
“monopoloid gains,” although this only happens af ter a war over the structure of  the industry.  
It is also evident that Knightian “anticipations” in the context of  unequal skill are part and 
parcel of  innovation, for instance, as in the f irst page of  his chapter in Business Cycles called 








motion the competitive struggle as it engages the old spheres, as well as creating  imitating 
competitors along the “path of  innovation.”127  
The focus of this work was on business cycles and he was not trying to develop or 
elaborate a theory of  competition, such as might play the role that the theory of  competition has 
traditionally played in economic theory. Neither his sociologist biographer, Richard Swedberg, nor 
his business historian biographer, Thomas McCraw, realize this theoretical intention or how 
Schumpeter’s questions and perspectives grow out of  the existing literature. While Business 
Cycles was written during the great depression, Schumpeter’s actual analysis of  the great 
depression—that it was due to allowing bank failures en masse—was absent f rom the text.128 The 
argument for a new theoretical approach to competition, so it may serve its traditional role in 
economic theory, was saved for Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy .   
5.3 Competition in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
The problem of  medium and long term prof its—in the face of , as we will see, creative 
destruction—becomes the focus of  the analysis in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy . The 
problems for entrepreneurs and managers created by a world of  innovation—essentially the 
fundamental uncertainty f rom rapid economic change facing investment—raises the problem that 
a business needs to manage this constant change. The economic system can never be stationary 
and the impulse which keeps the “capitalist engine in motion comes f rom the new consumers’ 
goods, new methods of  production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of  industrial 
organization that capitalist enterprise creates.”129 This results in competitive forces unlike those 
assumed in static approaches. One of t quoted passage reads that the competition which counts 
is: 
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“...the competition f rom the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of  
supply, the new type of  organization...competition which commands a decisive cost or 
quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of  the prof its and the output of  the 
existing f irms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of  competition is 
much more ef fective than the other as a bombardment is in comparison with forcing a 
door...it disciplines before it attacks.”130 
 
It is to be expected that rational behavior in such an environment is to manage these risks. For 
Schumpeter’s, this is done through business or regulative strategy. Business strategy, he writes, 
obtains its signif icance in this uncertain and competitive environment: “It must be seen in its role 
in the perennial gale of  creative destruction: it cannot be understood irrespective of  it or, in fact, 
on the hypothesis that there is a perennial lull.” This competition is not the sort of  competition 
which simply “drives out high cost producers” and steadily reduces prof its f rom  innovation but 
rather competition which entirely threatens product lines, production, and a f irm’s existence. 131  
Compared to young Schumpeter, there are two new elements in his competitive analysis 
which play functional roles: regulative strategy and creative destruction. In mainstream 
economics, creative destruction has been received into the textbooks but regulativ e strategy has 
not. This is a mistake because of  the importance of  the concept in a dynamic model of  
competition. Indeed, Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis itself  refers to business strategy 
a number of  times at one point writing that assumptions o f  perfect competition as the general 
state of  af fairs can be called: “the Principle of  Excluded Strategy and accordingly say that the bulk 
of ...pure theory...was a pure theory of  static equilibrium that excluded strategy” (emphasis 
Schumpeter’s).132 
The concept of  “regulative strategy” exists to manage “creative destruction” and “creative 
destruction” exists, in Schumpeter’s model, to destroy regulative strategies which have thus far 
protected prof it positions. These two ideas are connected at conception and  are def ined in 
contrast to each other in terms of  their analytic function. A few economists—like his sociologist 
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biographer who suggests his analysis of  monopolistic competition may be tongue in cheek —miss 
the fact that Schumpeter is attempting to present a new theory of  competition which can continue 
to serve its traditional role in economic theory, albeit within a realistic dynamic model.  
5.3.1 Creative Destruction and Regulative Strategies 
For Schumpeter, the future is full of  threats f rom new innovation enabled through the 
increasing returns environment which is rapidly changing the calculation of  business. “Long range 
investing under rapidly changing conditions,” Schumpeter writes, “especially under conditions that 
change or may change at any moment under the impact of  new commodities and technologies, is 
like shooting at a target that is not only indistinct but moving—and moving jerkily at that.”133 
Patents, secrecy, long period contracts may help but the problem is more extreme due to other 
risks which are “no less an element in long -run costs” and where one is unable to insure against. 
In such cases, other means must be devised to protect investment f rom the fundamental 
uncertainty of  the future and those means are “regulative” or business strategy. Schumpeter, it 
should be noted, also calls it restrictive strategy, not in the sense of  restricting output but of  
restricting competition in the Dobbian sense. Schumpeter cites the case of  new f irms or new 
aggressors for illustration because these instances allow for greater illustration.134 These 
aggressors: 
“Require, for purposes of  attack and defense, also pieces of  armor other than price and 
the quality of  their product which, moreover, must be strategically manipulated all 
along...largest-scale plans could in many cases not materialize at all if  it were not known 
f rom the outset that competition will be discouraged by heavy capital requirements or lack 
of  experience, or that means are available to discourage or checkmate it so as to gain the 
time and space for further developments.”135 
 
Schumpeter notes that even one of  the most aggressive corporate strategies of  all time—the 
Standard Oil railroad rebate scheme covered by Ida Tarbell in 1904—can be seen in a dif ferent 
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light when the scheme is viewed only f rom the perspective of  the total output and ignoring the 
moral implications.136  
Many enterprises would not have begun, Schumpeter notes, if  they did not believe that 
“exceptionally favorable situations are likely to arise which, if  exploited by price, quali ty and 
quantity manipulation will produce prof its adequate to tide over exceptionally unfavorable 
situations provided these are similarly managed.”137 The argument includes old and established 
f irms in that they have to develop strategies to manage change, inclusive of  moments when 
obsolete industries attempt to “turn a rout...into orderly retreat.”138 All of  this, he writes, is “the 
tristest common sense” which is “overlooked with a persistence so stubborn as to raise the 
question of  sincerity.”139 The debates on the empirical fact of  price rigidity miss the point and may 
be better understood as attempts by industry to avoid the chaos of  always adapting prices to the 
environment by following a pricing policy and strategy to even out these ef fects, thereby help ing 
to stabilize their markets.  
The terminology of  “monopoly” is, as well, problematic for Schumpeter given its historical 
development in the classics and, eventually, in Cournot and Marshall. Firms which appear to 
have the most monopolistic elements—like railroads and power utilities—had to “create the 
demand for their services and, when they had done so, to defend their markets against 
competition.”140 In the f irst conception of  monopolies, like the Tudor and Stuart monopolies 
criticized by Adam Smith, the monopoly price is higher and the output smaller than the 
competitive price and output. In the modern conception, however, “there are superior methods 
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available to the monopolist” which their competitors either cannot access at all or only slowly, with 
Schumpeter noting that the monopoly may attract abler employees and have better f inancial 
standing, with the result that “monopoly prices are not necessarily higher or monopoly outputs 
smaller” than under the competitive hypothesis.  
 The monopolistic competition analysis outside of  the static schema results in an entirely 
dif ferent conclusion than that understood by Cournot and Marshall because they arise in the 
context of  creative destruction—innovation, increasing returns, fundamental uncertainty—and 
since they “largely create what they exploit.”141 The history of  US railroads in the west are the 
striking example of  this process of  circular and cumulative causation. One acclaimed business 
history, Overton’s Burlington Route, writes that the dilemma of  the American west was that 
“without a substantial population in its territory willing and able to ship and travel, no railroad 
could survive as a venture, but only a railroad could bring about a rapid development of  the 
area.”142  
Furthermore, the typical conclusion that long run output is below competitive conditions is 
only applicable in a static model. If  an innovation allows for a temporary monopoly on a product, 
there are still some substitutes and the demand schedule for the new product needs to be built up 
overtime. The element of  “monopoly gain in those entrepreneurial prof its which are the prizes 
of fered by capitalist society to the successful innovator” have their main function in that it gives 
“space...for long-range planning” which is back where we started with business strategy.143 Not all 
f irms successfully make the transition f rom innovation to long term planning —for instance, Ford 
Motor in its early contests with General Motors. To illustrate the importance of  strategy in a 
realistic dynamic theory of  monopolistic competition, we discuss two examples f rom business 
history in section 5.4 below. 
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5.3.2 Schumpeter Responds to Critics 
 Schumpeter closes his discussion of  monopolistic competition by pointing out that static 
models of  imperfect competition preclude progress, entail wastes of  their own, and moreover are 
all impossible on their own terms. Business strategy, f requently resulting in the development of  
large-scale establishments, is for Schumpeter the most powerful engine of  progress in terms of  
the expansion of  long range output.  
 In the preface to the second edition of  Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy published 
1946, Schumpeter reacts to the “what many readers considered to be a defense 
of  monopolistic practice.”144 He writes that he is only describing the history and theoretical 
situation of  monopolistic competition which “no competent economist can deny.” He writes: 
“1. The classical theory of  monopolistic pricing (the Cournot -Marshall theory) is 
not entirely valueless, especially when overhauled so as to deal not only with the 
instantaneous maximization of  monopoly gain but also with maximization over time. But it 
works with assumptions that are so restrictive as to exclude its direct application to 
reality. In particular it cannot be used for what it is being used in current teaching, 
namely, for a comparison between the way in which a purely competitive economy 
functions and the way in which an economy functions that contains substantial elements 
of  monopoly.  
The main reason for this is that the theory assumes given demand and cost 
conditions, the same for the competitive and the monopolistic case, whereas it is of  the 
essence of  modern big business that its demand and cost conditions are, for large 
quantities of  output, much more favorable—and inevitably so—than the demand and cost 
conditions that would exist in the same industries in a régime of  perf ect competition.  
2. Current economic theory is almost wholly a theory of  the administration of  a 
given industrial apparatus. But much more important than the manner in which capitalism 
administers given industrial structures is the manner in which it creates them...into this 
process of  creation the monopoly element enters necessarily.”145  
 
The manner in which capitalism creates industrial structures is through prof itable innovations 
which allow for the application of  regulative strategy. These strategies inherently have “monopoly 
elements” and result in imperfectly competitive market structures at any given moment in time. 
This monopolistic competition is, however, general in that all f irms are seeking to establish 
attractive demand and cost conditions with their strategy; or, in other words, all f irms are seeking 
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prof its in a dynamic environment with uncertainty and creative destruction. The strategies whose 
outcome is an attractive demand and cost condition are those which are successful in managing 
the rapidly changing environment or, in other words, those who successfully manage the 
uncertainty created by creative destruction.  
5.3.3 Competition in History of Economic Analysis 
“Forward strategy very of ten requires defensive tactics as a complement,” Schumpeter 
writes early on his History of Economic Analysis before complaining that economists are stubborn 
in their refusal to discuss business strategy .146 In his last great work, some of  the lineage drawn 
up in this essay can be seen. For instance, when discussing entrepreneurial gains Schumpeter 
writes: 
“The fundamental reason is that entrepreneurial gains are not permanent returns at all 
but emerge each time—to adopt the language of  the Knight-Dobb theory—an 
entrepreneur’s decision in conditions of  uncertainty proves successful and have no 
def inite relation to the size of  the capital employed.”147  
 
And that:  
“In the second place, it should be observed that, whatever their nature in other respects, 
entrepreneurs’ gains will practically always bear some relation to monopolistic pricing. 
Whatever it is that produces these gains, it must of  necessity be something that, for the 
moment at least, competitors cannot parallel for, if  they did, no surplus over costs 
(including entrepreneurial ‘wages’) could emerge. The successful introduction of  a new 
commodity or brand is perhaps the best illustration of  this. Moreover, there are means 
available to the successful entrepreneur—patents, ‘strategy,’ and so on—for prolonging 
the life of  his monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic position and for rendering it more dif ficult 
for competitors to close up on him.”148  
 
Schumpeter follows these notes by saying that this has much in common with a “depredation 
theory” (i.e., exploitation) of  profits and that interpretation seems to be a matter of  ideology:  
 
“Obviously, this may be linked up with the elements of  the case that have been glanced 
at in the preceding paragraph in such a way as to yield a picture of  reality that may, for 
practical purposes, dif fer but little f rom that drawn by a straight depredation theory. Rare 
birds indeed are the economists who give the proper weight to this set of  facts and at the 
same time do not overstress them. It is here rather than in the fundamental question of  
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theory involved that ideological bias as well as political interest assert themselves. On 
principle, a sponsor of  a functional theory is at liberty to give as much weight to predatory 
activities as he pleases. But most economists who wrote before 1914 may have 
underutilized this f reedom as much as many of  their successors have abused it. It must 
not be forgotten, however, that the widespread hostility to big business and to ‘trusts,’ so 
far as there was any analytic meaning to it, does imply equally widespread recognition of  
the facts referred to.”149 
 
The observation here regarding ideology leads the way into many important problems facing the 
method of  economics. While these are beyond the scope of  this essay, one relevant instance of  
these ideological problems can be mentioned here. In Frank Knight’s preface to the 1957 edition 
of  Risk, Uncertainty, and Profits he explains that economic “truth” is pitted against “combating 
prejudice” and that Knight thinks it more useful to side with the latter because this makes 
“economics more useful to society” and forces economists to sell their line.150 In this preface, he 
is advising economists not to dissent f rom orthodoxy as he himself  had done. The implication is 
that he views his theory of  “actual prof its” and imperfect competition arising f rom uncertainty to b e 
“truth” while viewing the concept of  perfect competition as a means of  “combating prejudice.”  
5.4 Historical Examples 
After the above discussion, with its focus on how actual competition works in a dynamic 
model with uncertainty, we appeal to the historical record to demonstrate the overwhelming 
importance that regulative strategy can have on actual historical outcomes. First, we will review 
how Ford Motor did not parlay its initial prof its f rom innovation into a long term strategy which 
would protect the f irm's market position. Ford Motor eventually lost its lead to General Motors 
who followed a distinctly dif ferent strategy. Af terward, we will review how the mail order f irms 
encountered the changing market brought on by the development of  the automobile. The result 
was a need to change strategies. The crucial point in each case is the determining factor of  
regulative strategy as compared to price, product or advertising competition.   
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5.4.1 Ford versus General Motors: 1908 - 1929 (Example 1) 
Schumpeter wrote in Business Cycles that the automobile industry qualif ies “for the role 
of  standard example for the process embodied in our model [of  economic change].”151 And that it 
“did not simply expand in function of  the increase in real income but helped to bring it about.”152  
General Motors, despite its bankruptcy in 2009, was the 12th greatest wealth creating 
f irm between 1926 and 2017 due to its long history of  dividends and above market returns in the 
middle of  the 20th century. It also went through one of  the most well known strategic contests 
with Ford Motor which can be used to illustrate aspects of  economic reality which Sc humpeter’s 
theory of  competition attempts to capture. The strategic contest can be described as follows.  
Ford’s assembly line innovation gave it a huge position, about half  the market in 1914, 
with commensurate prof its. By the mid-1920s, it ranked f irst in payments for wages and supplies 
in the United States. It achieved this by focusing on the low end of  the market with the Model T, 
thereby expanding the market. From the start, Ford Motor was concentrated on a single product 
and maximizing the economies of  scale f rom this single product.  
General Motors, a collection of  consolidated small volume automobile manufacturers 
backed by Du Pont, saw that its best strategy—the strategy which best managed the long term 
uncertainty of  investment—was to build automobiles in volume at dif ferent price points, in part 
because of  their sunk costs in numerous acquired divisions pointed in this direction, in part 
because of  the advancing income of  the US consumer would allow for greater long term product 
dif ferentiation. This was particularly important as the market was evolving to one where 
consumers purchased a replacement automobile, rather than their f irst automobile. Industrial 
capacity came to outstrip demand and Chandler writes, “Marketing became a greater problem 
than production” and that “Henry Ford refused to take seriously these fundamental changes in the 
market.”153 General Motors was transparent about its strategy, for instance disclosing it in detail in 
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their 1923 annual report. Ford could have imitated it but rather choose to follow their largely 
single product strategy.  
Over the course of  the 1920s it was to become clear that GM’s strategy was superior and 
Ford was forced to change strategies in imitation in the late 1920s. The defeat of  Ford was all the 
more striking because they had to entirely stop production. The predominant factor in determining 
the competitive outcome of  this inter-industry competitive struggle was having the right strategy to 
manage the uncertainty of  investment in the face of  the rapidly changing environment.  
To illustrate the importance of  this point, consider that Henry Ford’s technically superior 
River Rouge plant embodied the mistake of  his strategy, despite its superiority in output. Its large 
f ixed costs were geared to the low cost production of  a single, increasingly outdated, product: the 
Ford Model T with its production run of  18 years. These high f ixed costs reduced f lexibility in the 
face of  a rapidly changing market and dismissed the lessons of  General Motors strategy of  “a car  
for every purse and purpose.”154  
General Motors’ dealer strategy further illustrates the wisdom of  their overall policies, 
while also illustrating the complex character of  regulative strategy more generally. General Motors 
allowed dealers a greater markup on new vehicles than Ford—making it more attractive to sell 
General Motors vehicles—while providing them with back of f ice services and f inancing. 
Furthermore, General Motors did not interfere with dealer pricing for used vehicles. Ford, by 
contrast, limited markups on used vehicles, only allowed a smaller markup on new vehicles and 
did not assist dealers with the back of fice or provide f inancing. Clearly, it was more attractive to 
be a dealer for General Motors and this was an explicit strategy of  the f irm.  
 Strategic dif ferentiation between the two f irms can also be seen in their attitude towards 
vertical integration. General Motors, for purposes of “insurance,” had a strategic policy of  100% 
control of  33% of  their parts and accessory suppliers. That is,  they only partially vertically 
integrated as a matter of  strategy. Ford Motor, by contrast, was as vertically integrated as 
 
 




possible. Chandler has written that “by using dif fering strategies of  vertical integration both 
General Motors and Chrysler paid a smaller price than Ford for operating at reduced capacity.”155 
Alf red Sloan, president of  GM and architect of  their strategy, wrote that:  
“Every enterprise needs a concept of  its industry. There is a logical way of  doing 
business in accordance with the facts and circumstances of  an industry, if  you can f igure 
it out. If  there are dif ferent concepts among the enterprises involved, these concepts are 
likely to express competitive forces in their most vigorous and most decisive form.”156  
 
 
Clearly, Ford’s strategy was to of fer one primary product and to maximize the cost 
advantages of  large scale production with signif icant vertical integration. He was known for saying 
that customers can have “any color that he wants so long as it is black.” This focus missed t he 
power of  General Motors’ strategy, which began in the mid -1920s to better meet the needs of  
their changing market. The success of  General Motors’ strategy was particularly striking in that it 
forced Ford to completely stop production for several months to retool their River Rouge plant in 
1927. Chrysler, simply by imitating General Motors strategy, was able to capture more market 
share than Ford by the late 1930s.  
5.4.2 Sears and the Development of Department Stores (Example 2) 
The rapid changes in the market brought about by the automobile forced the great mail 
order f irms to change strategy. This can be seen in the story of  Sears Roebuck transition f rom a 
mail order f irm into a retailer. At the start of  their business, Sears was an imitator of  Montgomery 
Ward and only sold watches and jewelry by mail order. Montgomery Ward had discovered the 
potential demand in the countryside by selling goods and having them delivered to railroad 
terminals for pick up. Sears, Roebuck and Company in 1895 expanded their merchandise into the 
goods wanted in the American countryside and, overtime, had suf f icient success in 
merchandising to surpass Montgomery Ward in sales.157 Both f irms quickly made investments in 
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distribution facilities that had volume and lines of  business that greatly exceeded the largest chain 
and department stores. Using the language of  Schumpeter, the success of  these two f irm’s gave 
them room for long range planning which was, in this case, put to good use. By the end of  1970, 
af ter successfully adopting a new strategy in the 1930s, Sears was the 6th most wealth creating 
f irm since 1926 behind only General Motors, IBM, Standard oil of  New Jersey (not yet  renamed 
Exxon), AT&T and DuPont.  
The importance of  regulative strategy as an element in the theory of  competition can be 
highlighted by the changes which took place with the increasing presence of  the automobile. The 
economics of  rural mail order shipment rested, in part, on the dif f iculty of rural America getting to 
a market where they could purchase goods. An executive of  Montgomery Ward and former U.S. 
brigadier general, Robert Wood, noticed f rom the Statistical Abstract Of The United States  that 
the United States was rapidly urbanizing. Robert Wood, af tering trying to sound the alarm at 
Montgomery Ward, joined Sears on the understanding that he would be able to develop a 
strategy to encounter the changes in the market, namely, the introduction of  retai l stores to 
distribute durable goods at high volumes in urbanizing areas.  
The changing market required a change in strategy to manage the uncertainty which was 
being created by this change. The outcome of  this struggle was not determined by shif ting 
advertising dollars, adjusting the product, or of fering the best price. It was determined through 
having the best strategy to manage long term uncertainty driven by rapid economic change. 
Despite being new to the f ield of  retailing and claiming to have made every mistake possible in 
the f ield, Sears began to have success and Montgomery Ward belatedly began to imitate 
successfully. Sears shif ted full gear into their retailing strategy when Robert Wood came to head 
Sears in 1928.  
Wood later says in 1948, “Business is like war in one respect—if  its grand strategy is 
correct, any number of  tactical errors can be made yet the enterprise proves successful.”158 His 
 
 




retailing strategy was to concentrate on growing urban markets, with a mix of  dif ferent store sizes, 
targeting population areas above a certain threshold to avoid competing with their rural mail order 
business. The point was, naturally, to leverage their past mail order investments and to avoid 
cutting into their existing mail order business.  
The dif ferent store sizes were positioned to compete against the other retail stores of  the 
era who did not have the same buying power in durable goods as a mail order house. Taking into 
account the revolution of  the automobile, furthermore, meant a spread of  retailing centers to new 
points and Sears located many of  its stores away f rom expensive city centers to cheap land 
accessible f rom highways.  
To manage the uncertainty of  their supply, Sears’ strategy was to buy an interest in 
factories which made goods where the supply was most uncertain. The f irm restricted its 
ownership to 50% or less and preferred that the factory continued to sell some of  its output to 
other f irms. From a unit cost perspective, their strategy was essentially to link up volume buying 
power with mass production and mass distribution and take advantage of  their scale. 159 Overtime, 
the f irm would come to design their own products for reasons of , quoting Chandler, increasing “its 
control over the function of  coordinating the f low of  products to include every step f rom the initial 
design of  the product to its sale to the ultimate customer.”160  
By the early 1930s, the mail order business deteriorated rapidly with revenues falling 
f rom $266 million in 1929 to $116 million in 1932—a 56.3% collapse—due to a fall in farm 
incomes f rom the great depression. Their retail business initially grew between 1929 and 1931 
until the depression caught up with them in 1932 at which point their retail business was only 
8.6% below 1929, a comparatively good result justifying their prior shif t in strategy. 161 Their 
investment into physical retailing both generated new streams of  profits and helped to protect 
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their prior investment in handling facilities. Without making the change the f irm likely could not 
have survived the rapidly changing conditions in their market in the early 1930s.  
In this example, as in the General Motor’s example, the f irms required a specif ic strategy 
to manage the uncertainty of  rapid change and the f irms invested based on the quantitative and 
qualitative changes they perceived in their market. These investments served to simultaneously 
grow future prof its and protect their past investments. Their strategies took into account the 
complexity of  the market conditions and they organized their strategy in such a way so as to 
maximize their long term success within those conditions. While the f irms were seeking prof itable 
investment outlets, their search for investment and prof its were in the context of  a general 
strategy which was designed to manage the rapidly changing conditions, placing the f irm in the 
best position possible for what were perceived as future conditions based on information 
available at the time.  
Especially in the case of  Sears is it clear that their business required a new strategy 
given the subsequent fall of f in their mail order business. In this context, it is clear that these f irms 
were competing not specif ically on the “product” of  marketing and distribution or on price or on 
advertising driven loyalty but on another level of  organizational concepts—“grand strategy”—
which had to play out over long range periods of  time. Had the f irm not changed strategies and 
chosen the right one, the f irm would have been creatively destroyed.  
The theoretical point of  these examples is to emphasize the theoretical critique of  
marginalism in Schumpeter—that mere price, product and advertising competition is insuf f icient 
to explain capitalist competition—and to illustrate his theory of  regulative strategies to manage 
the creatively destructive environment. It is not enough to say f irms prof it maximize or to describe 
competition in terms of  price, product or advertising. In a realistic dynamic system with increasing 
returns and uncertainty f irms must plan on the basis of  a concept of  their market—or rather of  
their future market—and then follow a strategy to regulate the uncertainty of  their investment in 
accordance with this point of  view.  
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Firms are necessarily seeking prof its and growth but the complexion of  competition arises 
through competing strategies to manage uncertainty of  past and forward looking investment. 
Theories of  competition which consider only price or product competition are, in that sense, 
inadequate to the tasks of  explaining the regulative function of  competition between dif ferent f irms 




6. Conclusion: Schumpeter and Bessembinder 
The results f irst identif ied by Bessembinder indicates that there is an extreme skew in 
corporate wealth creation, suggesting the continuous existence of  large market share winners 
with prices suf f iciently above costs to allow for large accounting prof its or, at least, the long term 
promise of  prof its. Across the entire data set it is also clear that many f irms become large wealth 
creators for decades before losing their position overtime. A few f irms are important corporate 
wealth creators for the entire 9 decades of  the dataset.  
The continuous persistence of  exceptional f irms over many decades determine average 
f inancial returns by dramatically skewing the distribution. The typical increase in U.S. public 
corporate wealth resides within these f irms. These f irms are critical factors in determining other 
“average” relationships throughout the economy, like price, quality and distribution. Furthermore, 
these average returns enter into the state of  long-term expectations which, in Keynes, eventually 
impacts the aggregate level of  investment.162  
Our interest was in the realistic theories of  competition which could best describe this 
historical outcome. A survey of  realistic static equilibrium theories showed that they stopped at 
the door of  the most important theoretical questions because they could not explain important 
aspects of  realistic f irm behavior, most notably increasing returns. Many of  these theories also 
assume long run “normal” prof its, an assumption which f lies in the face of  Bessembinder’s 
results.  
This failure of  static theory drove the search into dynamic theory, with its focus on change 
and actual outcomes. The period of  dynamic theory we examined began with Schumpeter’s 1911 
book, The Theory of Economic Development, which helped inspire the theoretical foundations of  
 




Knight’s 1921 book, Risk, Uncertainty and Profits. Dobb responds to both of them in 1925 with 
Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress which, though perhaps “jejune,” raised a critical 
theoretical problem about their theories: they did not describe the long term maintenance of  prof it 
positions which were evident to Dobb. Here we f ind a focus on how the response of  competition 
is slowed or stopped to allow for prof its to be maintained and capitalized. But even here, Dobb 
neglects how the things he discusses are overcome by competition, only mentioning that 
uncertainty f rom economic change means signif icant losses at irregular intervals which, in the 
progress of  civilization, are assumed to be counterbalanced by the gains. We argue that only late 
Schumpeter deals with the whole problem by describing the creation of  prof it positions, their 
maintenance, and their competitive destruction. The skew in corporate wealth creation can only 
be explained by a theory which can account for the whole life cycle of  f irms, as Schumpeter’s 
theory does. Static equilibrium theories where all the f irms have the same cost structure, 
annihilating any competitive advantages f rom increasing returns, cannot be used to explain the 
skew in corporate wealth creation.  
Frank Knight’s theory of  prof it and imperfect markets f rom uncertainty may explain 
temporary large prof it positions and why concentrated markets can exist but it does not explain 
why these prof it positions are sometimes protected f rom competition. Schumpeter’s f irst theory of  
innovation had the same problem writing “competitors...first reduce and then annihilate [the 
entrepreneurs] prof it.”163 But we know that many of  these competitive positions generate a 
disproportionate amount of  wealth for decades and therefore these early theories of  Schumpeter 
and Knight are insuf f icient to explain the long term skew in wealth creation. Dobb helps to f rame 
the problem as rather related to the slowing or prevention of  new supply f rom competitors. 
Schumpeter views Dobb’s Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress as clearly positioning Dobb 
as a capitalist in terms of  his economics, regardless of  his politics.164  
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With the introduction of  “regulative strategies” Schumpeter presents his own concept of  
the persistence of  prof it positions and introduces one of  the most famous terms to show how 
these prof it positions are dismantled: creative destruction. Thus, Schumpeter makes the case for 
a realistic theory of  prof it positions, imperfect markets, the slowing or prevention of  new 
competitors, with their eventual decline—all of  which is implied by our survey of  the historic skew 
in corporate wealth creation. This skew in corporate wealth creation is a result of  competitive 
struggles with big winners in monopolistically competitive markets who then protect their market 
positions with business strategy, sometimes for decades. Strategy is crucial for Schumpeter as 
mere product, price, or trademark superiority are seen as insuf f icient to describe historical 
outcomes.  
Knight wrote in 1921 that actual prof its are a residual—they are what is lef t over af ter 
everything else has been determined in the context of  uncertainty. In this sense, prof its need not 
have some specif ic relationship with the capital employed—this is also Schumpeter’s position and 
it is what appears to be born out by the diverge rates of  the growth of  wealth uncovered by an 
investigation in long term f inancial returns.165 Dobb notes that Cantillon def ined the entrepreneur 
as “one who bought goods ‘at a f ixed price’ and sold them ‘at an uncertain price.’”166 There is 
uncertainty in sales, whereas costs are more predictable and determined. If  an entrepreneur has 
better anticipated the future, they can prof it to the extent that the market will “bear the traf f i c.” A 
f irm can invest where it anticipates having a high likelihood of  success and where the investments 
are protective of  past and ongoing investments. The protective nature of  investments are part of  a 
“regulating strategy” whose goal is to make the future more predictable and manageable, even if  
probabilities can only be a Knightian “estimate of  an estimate.”  
The anticipations that really pay of f  are those which are innovative and introduce new 
things into the ongoing f low of  the economic system, since new things are not immediately 
copyable without dif f iculty. These innovations and anticipations generate receipts and short run 
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prof its which give room for long term strategy before competitors, to quote Schumpeter, follow 
“af ter them...in increasing numbers, in the path of  innovation, which becomes progressively 
smoothed for successors by accumulating experience and vanishing obstacles.”167  
Firms follow a strategy to build up aspects of  their business which competitors may not 
f ind possible to replicate—like their trade-mark, supplier relationships, technical innovations, 
product design, and good will—all while envisioning a plan which will best insulate them from the 
best ef forts of their competitors. The plan or strategy is designed to slow, or entirely eliminate, a 
competitor’s ability to parallel what the innovative f irm has done. In no sense does this imply the 
restriction of  output and in many cases it means the opposite, since the latter prevents a 
competitor’s ability to parallel a f irm seeking to ex tend an existing cost advantage through scale. 
It is illustrative to note that, because of  this phenomenon, the risk faced by an entrepreneur may 
not be simply upward sloping with capital invested, as in Kalecki’s principle of  increasing risk, but 
may initially drop as increasing investment initially lowers risks by preventing ef fective 
competition. 
Firms cultivate a strategy based on what they believe will reduce the uninsurable 
uncertain risks to their prof it streams. This is not the forecastable variance of  returns as in Steindl 
but a risk to capital of  another order.168 All these decisions are based on the nature of  their 
specif ic and varied markets—such as the degree of  capital intensity allowed for in production, 
giving room for economies of  scale, or the degree to which consumer demand can be ensured 
through building goodwill via advertising or service levels—with the implication that it would be 
dif f icult to generalize f rom any one competitive struggle. If  the innovating f irm is successful and 
continues to grow and scale, eventually the competitors will recede, fail, and the market will look 
oligopolic. There will be advantages in size, either through the scale of  the plant, or the scaling on 
f ixed administrative and selling expenses—as in Chandler’s “scope”—or in the advantage derived 
f rom being able to tap into accumulated goodwill, as noted by Dobb.  
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A successful strategy leads to the greater application of  existing advantages, leading to 
more concentrated markets. This theory of  market concentration does not disagree with Steindl’s 
multiple theories of  concentration f rom diversity, where his favored f irms grow faster than 
disadvantaged f irms due to simple advantages, even when the latter are arrived at through 
random processes.169  
Prof its may be reaped as the f irm achieves economies of  scale, further buttressing itself  
against the environment. The static theories of  competition cannot manage increasing returns, let 
alone uncertainty, or the sheer variety of  markets each which demand that a f irm has, quoting 
Alf red Sloan, “a concept of  its industry.” Alf red Sloan, manager of  General Motors while it was the 
greatest wealth creating f irm in the world, wrote that “there is a logical way of  doing business in 
accordance with the facts and circumstances of  an industry” and “if  there are dif ferent concepts 
among the enterprises involved, these concepts are likely to express competitive forces in their 
most vigorous and most decisive form.”170 If  the end market is large enough, successful f irms will 
begin to show up at the top of  a list of  wealth creation, at least until the environment changes 
threatening their prof it positions as their existing strategy is undermined by change. Eventually, 
they will be forced to adapt by “the law of  their own life” but, as history shows, many will be 
unable to do so.171  
The implications of  Schumpeter’s analysis is that there will be big winners in markets 
because of  the cumulative nature of  advantages developed through strategy, making it dif f icult for 
competitors following a inferior strategy or even for competitors who follow the superior strategy 
too late for it to make any dif ference. The latter implies the existence of  f irst mover advantages 
which are well documented in the business history literature, as in Alf red Chandler’s Scale and 
Scope. In many industries at the turn of  the 20th century, there was a huge advantage in scale of  
plant and therefore a common strategy was to scale as rapidly as possible since this prevented 
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ef fective competition. Chandler writes, “the latecomers’ [initial] investment not only had to be 
larger [to catch up], they were also riskier, precisely because of  the f irst movers’ competitive 
strength.”172  
These winners, however, exist in an industrial landscape which is constantly being 
transformed through increasing returns present across all industries, allowing for new divisions of  
labor and new innovations. It is a landscape which, at any moment of  time, appears to be one of  
monopolistic competition with concentrated market share. In time, the increasing returns 
environment outside the f irm will alter the superior uncertainty reducing strategy for the f irms in 
the industry, forcing adaptation or creative destruction.  
This analysis suggests that there are big winners and, perhaps, that the precariousness 
of  these winners depends on the nature of  change in their industry or, said another way, the time 
in which a strategy, once developed, can remain unchanged without danger. The nature of  
change for that industry depends on the degree of  increasing returns available to that industry 
and the qualitative change in the external environment. History seems to suggest that some 
industries, like cigarettes or chewing gum, are protected f rom change since the increasing returns 
available in production and distribution are limited. But even here, contemporary readers will note 
the progress of  “e-cigarettes” introducing a qualitatively new element into the otherwise “resistant 
to change” cigarette market. In other industries, like semiconductor manufacturers, there is 
constant evolution as every part of  their business and the entire environment outside of  their 
business is undergoing rapid change f rom increasing returns.  
The key dif ference between Schumpeter’s theory and the other static or dynamic theories 
before him can be illustrated in the following way. If  two f irms were the same in every respect at 
an initial point in time—equal amounts of  employee talent, f inancial capital, advantages of  
location and equal plant, etc.—the f irm following a superior uncertainty reducing strategy will 
rapidly accumulate further advantages. The cumulative ef fect of these advantages result in 
greater market share. The f irm following the more successful strategy wil l, furthermore, very likely 
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have more resources to invest into adjacent markets, if  they see this as a means of  lowering their 
total uncertainty. Following Knight, if  the f irm believes they can move into a new market with 
some certainty of  success, and which does not decrease their chances of  continued success in 
their “old” market, a more general strategy of  diversifying all their investment nearly compels the 
f irm to grow adjacently, if  only to scale their f ixed costs of administration, sales and distribution. 
Or, put another way, a rational policy of  reducing the uncertainty of  investment always compels 
investment and growth if  it reduces the long term uncertainty of  existing investments. It is not 
merely investment for accumulation but also investment to  protect investment. The f irm following 
the inferior strategy, despite beginning in the same position as the other f irm, will quickly be at a 
disadvantage. Depending on the nature of  their industry, this may be decisive or merely a 
setback. All this, to quote Schumpeter, is “the tristest common sense” which is “overlooked with a 
persistence so stubborn as to raise the question of  sincerity.”173 
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Size Top Firm 
Percent by Top 
Firm By Top 5 Firms 
By Top 25 
Firms 
1926-01-01 493 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 21.22% 67.43% 86.19% 
1927-01-01 521 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 13.91% 61.84% 80.14% 
1928-01-01 565 AT&T INC 18.26% 71.19% 90.20% 
1929-01-01 572 AT&T INC 15.33% 61.49% 83.37% 
1930-01-01 580 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 18.52% 61.68% 80.79% 
1931-01-01 597 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 12.50% 54.75% 72.78% 
1932-01-01 614 SHELL OIL CO 10.54% 50.54% 70.30% 
1933-01-01 620 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 11.70% 49.10% 67.77% 
1934-01-01 623 AT&T INC 12.87% 50.50% 66.74% 
1935-01-01 645 AT&T INC 12.10% 47.17% 63.35% 
1936-01-01 672 AT&T INC 9.06% 37.67% 53.45% 
1937-01-01 713 AT&T INC 9.44% 35.01% 51.94% 
1938-01-01 741 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 8.44% 36.44% 52.37% 
1939-01-01 766 CHRYSLER CORP 10.95% 57.36% 72.33% 
1940-01-01 788 COCA COLA CO 9.85% 50.46% 66.31% 
1941-01-01 818 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 8.45% 37.67% 53.91% 
1942-01-01 837 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 8.66% 38.50% 53.12% 
1943-01-01 860 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 9.49% 39.19% 53.55% 
1944-01-01 872 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 8.85% 40.62% 55.13% 
1945-01-01 879 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 9.07% 41.46% 55.79% 
1946-01-01 899 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 10.67% 44.89% 59.68% 
1947-01-01 920 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 10.17% 43.71% 59.87% 
1948-01-01 959 ARCONIC INC 8.35% 47.60% 65.22% 
1949-01-01 977 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 7.02% 41.62% 57.82% 
1950-01-01 1022 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 6.98% 41.17% 57.14% 
1951-01-01 1064 AT&T INC 7.30% 40.76% 56.79% 
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1952-01-01 1112 AT&T INC 8.87% 40.28% 54.30% 
1953-01-01 2012 AT&T INC 8.52% 43.12% 56.95% 
1954-01-01 2116 AT&T INC 8.94% 42.74% 55.46% 
1955-01-01 2270 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 9.92% 42.89% 54.08% 
1956-01-01 2383 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 8.67% 38.55% 50.25% 
1957-01-01 2483 IBM 8.19% 35.93% 49.05% 
1958-01-01 2615 IBM 9.70% 33.77% 44.84% 
1959-01-01 2755 IBM 9.34% 30.72% 41.12% 
1960-01-01 2978 IBM 13.60% 36.34% 49.39% 
1961-01-01 3154 IBM 8.27% 40.96% 54.22% 
1962-01-01 3337 IBM 6.71% 34.41% 48.16% 
1963-01-01 3517 IBM 9.17% 33.53% 49.95% 
1964-01-01 7168 IBM 7.11% 31.51% 50.71% 
1965-01-01 7171 JOHNSON & JOHNSON 4.07% 31.05% 49.53% 
1966-01-01 7210 IBM 5.17% 33.08% 50.06% 
1967-01-01 7343 EXXON MOBIL CORP 6.05% 29.58% 45.95% 
1968-01-01 7348 EXXON MOBIL CORP 7.72% 32.79% 45.97% 
1969-01-01 7392 SCHLUMBERGER LTD 6.43% 35.26% 48.99% 
1970-01-01 7496 EXXON MOBIL CORP 6.30% 25.74% 37.71% 
1971-01-01 7827 EXXON MOBIL CORP 4.87% 27.95% 38.52% 
1972-01-01 8434 NEC CORP 9.79% 31.29% 41.81% 
1973-01-01 8640 NEC CORP 12.23% 24.80% 34.86% 
1974-01-01 8536 NEC CORP 6.91% 18.90% 27.30% 
1975-01-01 9042 NEC CORP 5.24% 24.37% 31.79% 
1976-01-01 9450 NEC CORP 5.10% 20.80% 27.77% 
1977-01-01 10159 NEC CORP 5.38% 16.36% 25.25% 
1978-01-01 10961 NEC CORP 5.18% 18.40% 28.28% 
1979-01-01 11195 NEC CORP 4.67% 18.53% 27.23% 
1980-01-01 11303 NEC CORP 3.91% 19.47% 30.37% 
1981-01-01 11541 ALTRIA GROUP INC 2.78% 20.02% 33.32% 
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1982-01-01 11769 EXXON MOBIL CORP 3.20% 20.22% 31.81% 
1983-01-01 12126 EXXON MOBIL CORP 3.35% 20.55% 31.26% 
1984-01-01 12759 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 3.16% 18.37% 29.34% 
1985-01-01 13362 EXXON MOBIL CORP 2.64% 17.54% 29.91% 
1986-01-01 13527 COCA COLA CO 2.56% 18.12% 30.63% 
1987-01-01 14076 COCA COLA CO 2.89% 19.89% 31.67% 
1988-01-01 14471 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 3.15% 18.72% 31.09% 
1989-01-01 14493 MICROSOFT CORP 3.92% 22.09% 37.95% 
1990-01-01 14575 MICROSOFT CORP 5.04% 23.84% 39.28% 
1991-01-01 14815 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 4.21% 19.94% 33.65% 
1992-01-01 14605 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 4.28% 21.69% 34.69% 
1993-01-01 14284 MICROSOFT CORP 3.26% 19.36% 33.71% 
1994-01-01 14167 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 3.02% 18.61% 31.62% 
1995-01-01 14072 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 3.27% 17.50% 27.68% 
1996-01-01 13889 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 2.81% 15.89% 25.97% 
1997-01-01 13664 EXXON MOBIL CORP 3.16% 15.03% 24.97% 
1998-01-01 13330 EXXON MOBIL CORP 4.00% 16.14% 26.70% 
1999-01-01 12525 EXXON MOBIL CORP 5.89% 17.40% 27.64% 
2000-01-01 11640 ALTRIA GROUP INC 3.37% 16.55% 25.87% 
2001-01-01 10926 APPLE INC 3.87% 17.02% 26.51% 
2002-01-01 10305 APPLE INC 4.58% 18.82% 27.75% 
2003-01-01 9931 APPLE INC 4.34% 16.96% 26.22% 
2004-01-01 9751 APPLE INC 3.90% 16.57% 27.37% 
2005-01-01 9745 APPLE INC 4.80% 16.73% 28.32% 
2006-01-01 9608 APPLE INC 4.72% 18.74% 32.29% 
2007-01-01 9369 APPLE INC 4.90% 19.03% 31.59% 
2008-01-01 9090 APPLE INC 4.75% 20.72% 31.58% 
 
 
